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ABSTRACT
THE DIGITAL FULCRUM:
CONSEQUENCES OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ON GRAPHIC DESIGN
Özlem Özkal 
Ph. D. in A.D.A
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
December^ 1998
Departing from prevalent use and visible influence of computers on 
graphic design field, this study basically endeavours to elucidate 
the current problematics of the digital design process. In this 
context, with an inspection on the nature of technology, and 
respectively the concepts that form and help to specify computers, 
it aims to arrive at conclusions considering the relationship of 
graphic design and computers to help construct an awareness towards 
technology and computers in the digital design process.
Key Words: Technology, tool, machine, automation, computer, 
graphic design.
Ill
ÖZET
DİJİTAL DESTEK NOKTASI:
BİLGİSAYAR TEKNOLOJİSİNİN GRAFİK TASARIM ÜZERİNDE SONUÇLARI
Özlem Özkal
Sanata Tasarım ve Mimarlık Doktora Programı
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
Aralık, 1998
Bilgisayarların grafik tasarım alanındaki yaygın kullanımı ve gözle 
görünür etkilerinden hareketle, bu çalışmanın temel amacı, dijital 
tasarım sürecinin halen geçerli olan problemlerine eğilmektir. Bu 
bağlamda, teknolojinin doğası ve bununla ilintili olarak bilgisayarı 
kuran kavramlar ve bilgisayarların kendine özgü niteliklerini 
inceleyerek, grafik tasarım ve bilgisayar ilişkisine dair sonuçlara 
varmayı ve tasarım sürecinde bilgisayarlara dair bir bilinç 
oluşturulmasında yardımcı olmayı hedeflemektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler; Teknoloji, alet, makina, otomasyon,
bilgisayar, grafik tasarım.
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THE DIGITAL FULCRUM:
CONSEQUENCES OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
ON GRAPHIC DESIGN
Give me extension and motion^ 
and I will construct the universe,
Descartes
1. INTRODUCTION
Near 1999: Internet is not technological enough. Even the latest 
technology is not technological enough. We are already living in the 
future. And, time with its accelerating speed, images with their 
dense circulation and information with its restless flow continue to 
shape the milieu, leaving digital technology and the influence it 
imposes upon life for us to stalk after.
By penetrating into our everyday experience through opening up new 
territories for a new sense and sensitivity, digital technology puts 
itself up for being the fulcrum to move the world that Archimedes 
once looked for. By bringing also Descartes' aforestated life-time 
dream close to reality, it manifests itself as the peak of our 
technological evolution which now turns over a new page with this 
relatively recent digital step.
Today, computers, -the medium of the digital technology, are 
detached from their primary usage areas such as military and
scientific studies to extend into all kinds of activities related to 
a living. In the swift pace of the day, they stand almost as vital 
for they present the most efficient management of time, especially 
in a state where time is our only rarity. Deployed in various fields 
for performance, computers now capture the day.
On the other hand, in offices, markets, libraries or at home, beyond 
the ease and economy they introduce, computers make people feel 
obliged to rearrange their relationships with the surrounding 
environment. From the shift of the individual experiences to another 
space, new experiences emerge which in turn require certain changes 
in the ways we deal with things. Likewise, the shift of the social 
environment into a new medium exposes certain shifts in the society, 
as well. As noted, "Computer technology has become so common in our 
daily lives that few would refute that it has been the driving force 
for much of the technological change of the last several decades and 
is the major force for cultural change we have yet seen for the 
future" (Stainback 1993, 10). Such a transformation, on another 
level, can also be recognized in many disciplines basically due to 
the conversion of the traditional working space. In the field of 
science, it is the computers that made the development of fractal 
geometry possible for Mandelbrot or the theory of 'Butterfly Effect' 
for Edward Lorenz, both of which caused radical new orientations in 
physics. In the field of communications, digitally produced 
circulation of information makes its (high)way to provide a means of 
communication for the 'Global Village.' Essential to our subject, in 
graphic design, it is again the computers which gave rise to the 
most controversial designs of the last decade.
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Fig* 1.
April Greiman
SCI ARC: Making Thinking
Southern California Institute of Architecture^ 
poster^
1990
As it can be understood from the terms like 'image processing", 
'resolution', 'font', or 'format' which have already inhabited the 
graphic design terminology; or the carryover terms like 'cut', 
'copy', 'paste', 'kerning', or 'leading' (Barry 1990) which belong 
to the traditional design language, yet have quite different 
resonance now, the digital technology has integrated with the 
graphic design discipline from school departments to professional 
practice·
Beyond the spoken language, computer technology has its stamp 
essentially on the visual language of the contemporary graphic 
designs. Overimposed layers of images, extreme distortions, numerous 
filter effects blended with deconstructivist typography form the 
popular visual language in graphic design today· Such imagery which 
is considerably difficult or mostly impossible to be produced by 
using traditional design techniques like drawing, painting, 
photography or different printing methods, can quickly be achieved 
by a couple of commands on the computer.
The chaos manifested on the surface of designs, can also be 
recognized in the design process that is carried on in the terminal 
space. Calling to mind Edward Lorenz who developed the theory of 
'sensitivity to initial conditions' accidentally, due to mixing up 
the data in his computer (Gleick 1994), designers frequently reach 
at random solutions simply by mixing up the numerous ways for image 
processing presented by the softwares. This situation is put simply 
by a contemporary graphic designer, April Greiman: "I have built an 
entire career on mistakes", by declaring "in our studio we may call 
something an error; meanwhile others call us authorities" (fig. 1.)
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Fig. 2.
Neville Brody
Cover and inner slave for Microphonies,
Some Bizarre/Virgin Records
1984
(1992, 83)· Neville Brody, another well-known graphic designer of 
the era, explains the situation in a more humorous way; "•••if you 
have a thousand monkeys sit in front of a thousand typewriters for a 
thousand years, sooner or later one of them will write Shakespeare. 
That's what it's like with the Macintosh sometimes -if you sit there 
long enough and try enough different things, by accident one of them 
is going to be okay." (1992, 14) (fig. 2.). Such randomness to 
solutions, basically stemming from the difficulty of communicating 
with computers, cause deviations from the accustomed route of the 
design process that is supposed to follow more or less a linear path 
from the evolution of the concept to its visualization and 
reproduction. Furthermore, such unpredictable solutions also signify 
a loss of control in the design process partaking on behalf of the 
designer. The aspect of randomness while designing with computers, 
will be discussed at length in the following pages, by now I will be 
content to say that the integration of computers to the design 
process seems to make an arena of wicked problems more mysterious 
than ever.
As it can be understood, graphic design today has become a 
discipline which is performed in the digital medium that it has 
shifted into. Just as "Contemporary man can not be understood except 
in relation to technology" (Hood 1972, 26), the contemporary
graphic designer can not be understood except in relation to 
computers. In this context, this study basically endeavours to 
elucidate the relationship of technology and the contemporary 
graphic designer and explore the digitalized design process. The 
influence of the digital technology on graphic design is more
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Rudy VanderLans
Cover of Emigre Magazine 
1989
critical and radical than it is considered to be and there is no 
need to wait for a thousand years to see its full effects·
In this respect^ in order to understand the existing digital 
technology it is necessary to penetrate into the multilayered 
configuration of the technological body itself^ rather than 
simplifying it to 'a tool to be tamed'· The discernment that awaits 
beyond the questions 'what is technology' and 'what is (a) machine' 
will help to elucidate the concepts that give form and attain 
particularity to computers. In designers' casual relationship with 
today's digital technology, this will be consequently inspiring to 
relieve the remote and presumably convoluted confines of the digital 
design process which demands a fresh awareness.
2. ON TECHNOLOGY
So long as we represent 
technology as an instrument^ 
we remain transfixed in the 
will to master it,
Martin Heiddegger
2.1. The Context of Technology
2.1.1. 'What is technology?
The history of technology is not one; although its present is the 
one we live in. Since its histories are several, definitions stated 
in order to answer the simple question, 'What is technology', are 
also several. And, as its definitions are several one can suspect 
that their underlining notion of technology may correspondingly be 
several as well. At this instant, on the way to inquire a presimably 
simple question through the doubt that our notion of technology 
might not necessarily be unique nor permanent, one arrives at a 
point where the question becomes whether the nature of technology 
itself is undergoing transformation or not. So, does the nature of 
technology change which unavoidably gives way to different notions 
of it, which is nevertheless manifested in different definitions 
that are illustrated by the incongruities in its discourse along its 
historical path? If this is so, how can we handle such a diversity 
that awaits at the very first moment of the inquisition 'What is 
technology?'. If its systematics and parameters are changing 
continuously then how can we define 'What is technology?' and with
reference to what? Is it possible after all to suggest a unique 
answer to the question 'What is technology?'.
In spite of its everydaynessr it is interesting to encounter a 
resistive distance at the very preliminary efforts to approach 
technology by trying to peel away its several layers packed through 
the ages. Yet, in spite of all its intricacies it is equally
interesting to recognize technology as grounded on a singular plane 
as an everyday activity, and treated as one continuous entity within 
everyday language. This ground is such that, technology is depicted 
as if succeeding along a consistent path since the very moment of 
its formation up to the present which signifies that it will also be 
the case in the future. By looking at its course of movement from 
wheel to iridium phones, technology within its everyday setting 
stands as a means of taking giant leaps by providing mankind the 
necessary ways to reach the necessary ends. The reason that this 
progressive and consistent scheme which is embedded in today's
technological discourse has found acceptance without much 
questioning might be that it also stands as a metaphor for mankind's 
own progress in time, in his image of himself. After all, human
being coincident with its presence was occupied in making. It is
therefore, not inappropriate to think that wherever man has a place 
for himself, he also has a place for his technology. In this sense, 
the story of technology corresponds with the story of mankind 
because it was -like it is at the moment-, an essential ingredient 
of his day.
The interdependence between human being's presence and technology 
which is reflected with the engagement of technology with everyday
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or every present reflects another more or less evident relationship 
between the notions of 'everyday' and 'technology,' In the way 
technology acts as a component of everyday^ the notion of everyday 
also acts as a component of technology. As technology is connected 
with the presenty our presentness is also connected with technology. 
While technology penetrates into the present, the notion of 
presentness likewise can be found to be penetrating into the notion 
of technology. In this context, we can even define technology as the 
'agent of presentness'; because the technology at work draws the 
lines of 'what is present'. Technology shapes our sense of the 
present time and with contact to it we confirm our presentness. 
Therein, in this world which we have not yet decided whether it is 
shrinking or overexploding, to be able to hold on with the present 
time we need technology; because our connection with the present 
time is via the agency of technology. Messages about 'connecting 
people', 'getting wired', or 'plugging in' that refer to new 
electronic media which appear frequently in popular circulation are 
of no accident. In order to be connected or to feel connected to the 
present day, we need to be in touch with technology with one way or 
another, -over Internet, by satellite, with cellular phones, fax 
machines, computer games, cars, TV, etc. Therefore, in 
correspondence with the proposition that "contemporary man cannot be 
understood except in relation to technology" (Hood 1972, 26), it 
can be suggested that contemporary man cannot either situate himself 
in this present day unless he relates himself to technology in one 
way or another. This age is about connecting, and to connect to the 
age one needs technology.
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The notion of presentness, makes inescapable for the notion of 
technology to be considered apart from it, as well. By the way it is 
embedded in technology, the notion of presentness is an essential 
issue to be aware of while discussing technology; because as an 
invisible ingredient it has an effect on the possible answers to be 
given to the question 'What is technology?'. By providing the 
settings within which we approach the problem of technology, the 
present time influences our conception of it. As a matter of fact, 
the confusion created by the answers suggested by the question 'What 
is technology?' is partially due to this situation. Simply, whenever 
this question needs to be answered, the present settings act as the 
point of the compass. However, in the flow of time one present can 
never be the same with another. Therefore, technology defined with 
reference to a particular present time can never be the same with 
another definition which would be the output of another present 
setting. This problem is nevertheless encoded within the same 
question itself. As long as the onset of the inquiry is 'What is 
technology', the following answers ought to be given in present 
tense.
Since technology is always a very present issue, at each time the 
question 'What is technology?' is asked, the answers are provided 
within the concerned present settings. That is why its histories are 
several; because at each particular time, this question was answered 
referring to another particular present. When we refer to the 
history of technology within this present conditions without 
recognizing the events' own presentness, many conflicting arguments 
appear such as the case of clock and telescope which are both 
presented as the milestones of the history of technology for their
12
involvement with measurement that supposedly induced a 
transformation in the nature of science. On this subject^ while 
Lewis Mumford asserts that clocks which were to be made as early as 
the 10 th century were the first means of the mathematical 
measurement of the world (1963, 15); de Solla Price claims that 
before the 16th century there was hardly any measurement, and he 
depicts telescope and Galileo's observations published in 1610 to 
mark a turning point in the similar sense (1986, 243). Although 
both of the two events are among the major developments in the 
history of technology, their priorities are somehow related with the 
fact that Mumford was writing in the Machine Age, and Price in the 
Telecommunications Era. As a matter of fact, when such inventions 
like the clock or telescope were made the term 'technology' was not 
being used at all. From techne to technoscience the terms people 
have referred to describe technological activities have changed in 
accordance with the different settings governing them. That is why, 
the definitions of technology are also several. Each time technology 
was defined different conditions shaped by the concurrent time 
constituted the reference points. In accordance with the settings 
provided by a particular time, technology was employed differently 
which gave way to a different understanding about it. For this 
reason, the notions of technology are several, as well. The 
emergence of new conditions by necessitating new configurations, 
consequently enforced an appropriation in the notion of technology 
or simply what is understood by technology, suitable to the present 
situations. The dynamics of Aristotle's notion of techne, therefore 
are not of the same type with the notion of technoscience of the 
twentieth century.
13
From mere making to a self-standing enterprise^ the answer to the 
question "What is technology?' changes depending on the 
circumstances underlined by the concurrent time. The present time 
under concern by constituting a particular framework creates 
contextual differences. This signifies that when this question is in 
concern, one has to be aware of the possible contextual differences 
that may appear due to a particular context of time. In this sense, 
the common understanding of technology simply as "a means for an 
end' is although not totally wrong, far from being complete. This 
approach can neither grasp a divergent field like technology knit 
under the influence of shifting relationships nor penetrate into its 
multilayered configuration to be able to recognize whether there are 
laws governing its pattern or not. Such a view by relying only upon 
the practical use, does not even necessitate a further search for 
other possible contexts of technology and enclose it on a one 
dimensional plane. However, technology is a sum of its all possible 
dimensions that can change continuously, at each time leaving a 
residue on the surface outlined by its everyday practice.
Carl Mitcham by drawing attention to the problem of context for 
defining technology in general states that "technology is not a 
univocal term; it does not mean exactly the same thing in all 
contexts"; and he continues as:
... if what one means by technology is the making of 
activity and the use of material artifacts in general, then 
obviously technology can never be abandoned, and is in fact 
coeval with if not prior to (since animals also make and 
use artifacts like bird's nests and spider webs) the 
emergence of human life. On the other hand, if what one
14
means by technology is some particular form or social 
embodiment of this general human activity, then equally 
clearly technology is expendable; technologies have been 
abandoned over and over again throughout history, under 
both peaceful and violent circumstances (1978, 231-232)·
Mitcham evaluates the problem of context as a matter of different 
viewpoints that is apparent in "incompatible definitions" from 
"applied science" to "natural means", or from "rational efficient 
action" to "any super-natural self-concept", and proposes a 
structural analysis of technology to overcome this problem (1978, 
232)· Yet, in spite of his keen efforts in recognizing the influence 
of technology on life as a means of change, he does not consider 
that technology can also be influenced from these changes· Since his 
analysis does not tolerate possible shifts that may occur due to 
time, certain conclusions he arrives at cannot escape from being 
obsolete in a couple of decades as in the case of his arguments on 
technology-as-knowledge· From technological maxims to theories 
different sources of knowledge underlined by Mitcham are 
insufficient to deal with today's notion of technoscience for under 
this heading it is now argued that technological knowledge is not 
any longer purely technological but a web constituted by a merging 
of different fields like science, nature, politics, economy or 
history (Haraway 1997)·
These problems that await at the moment one steps into the territory 
of technology show that it is hard to be in control of this 
multilayered activity bifurcating in all possible directions· While 
the present conditions produce new contexts for technology,
15
technology is propelled forward to create new parameters for the 
present as a consequence· This dynamic interrelationship endows the 
field of technology with an intricate nature and the overall pace 
which makes it even more difficult to grasp· As it can be derived 
from McLuhan's discussion of the wheel which as the extension of the 
feet prerequired roads and then lifted by the bicycle on to the 
plane of aerodynamics that ended up with the aeroplane^ technology 
causes a ripple effect where the ripples then come across to cause 
others, sometimes in unforeseeable ways (McLuhan 1987).
George Basalla argues that the evolution of technology consists of 
"cumulative effects of small improvements", therein antecedents 
prepare the settings for the available technologies (1988, 23). 
Accordingly, he evaluates the technological evolution as continuous 
in the sense that each innovation is a result of a long term 
synthesis of series of prior developments like Eli Whitney's cotton 
gin which has its roots in Indian charka or roller gin as its 
predecessor. Other versions of this primitive model were even in use 
in South America and what Eli Whitney basically had done was to 
improve an already existing technology. Nevertheless, Basalla 
concludes:
The social, cultural, economic, and technical forces that 
created the need for a better way to clean short staple 
cotton came together in the American South during the last 
decade of the eighteenth century. An alternative 
environment in which cotton was not a desirable textile or 
one in which cheap labour was plentiful would not have 
encouraged a search for new ginning techniques (1988, 62).
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The way Baaalla takes into account the interaction of external 
factors that are shaped by a certain temporality to the evolution of 
technology indicate that although a particular technique might rest 
upon a series of antecedents, it attains its final form when it 
coincides with specific conditions. Once a certain development in 
technology is manifest, its historical links can be traced back; 
however such links are not necessarily the cause of the resultant 
outgrowth. Even following a chain of small improvements forward may 
not lead the way to a healthy forecast about the upcoming
developments as there will always be external factors at work which 
will not be very discernible. Basalla's discussion on the
development of automobiles can nevertheless illuminate this point. 
Although at the turn of the century three different types of
automobiles were produced driven either by steam, electric or
gasoline, among which the development of steam powered automobiles 
were at first reasonable as it was the most advanced technology, 
followed by the ones with electric power as a second alternative 
since electricity was considered to be the destiny of the coming 
epoch, none of the two paths were taken. Automobiles with internal 
combustion engines using gasoline which were the least in number of 
production have taken the lead instead. The reason for this was not 
only their being relatively more efficient and fast, or the 
geographical factors that provided resources and supply, but also 
the steam engine's "identification with the technology of the 
previous century", and the doubts against the maintenance of 
electric power in the future (1988, 202).
This once again draws attention to the interdependence between 
technology and the concurrent settings that encompass it. They
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interact in such a way that, although technology may advance in the 
form of successive steps that are in relation to each other, it 
takes directions depending on the regulations of the present 
settings. However, like the cotton gin which by introducing mass 
production caused a series of changes in the long term starting from 
the whole pattern of product manufacture, every new technology in 
turn produces new parameters for the existing settings, so that, as 
a consequence of the divergence of this pattern of relation it is 
sometimes difficult to judge which is the outcome of the other. Was 
it, for instance, printing itself among other things which caused 
the transition from geometry to mathematics since woodblocks were a 
suitable medium for writing numbers and equations rather than 
drawing lines and circles. Similarly, is it the development of new 
pattern recognition systems which causes the transformation from 
mathematics to intermaths since they can allow many operations at a 
time rather than following the mode of one relation at a time of 
traditional algebra. If one thing is clear, it is that in this 
pattern of development technology acts as an agent, and what remains 
out of this flux is the message of technology which is "the change 
of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs" 
(McLuhan 1987, 8).
Technology's span of and ability to change as the only consistent 
quality we have at hand for the moment, gives a clue about its 
nature; but at the same time through its turns and twists sets a 
distance before it. A distance to approach, a distance to understand 
and a distance to control technology. As a result, while its 
histories, definitions or notions may vary, this variety and the 
distance it sets upon imply the existence of some 'laws of the
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matter' which this time can be considered as precisely unique to the 
question 'what is technology'. In this context, a survey on 
different phases of technology will not only illuminate its 'mode of 
change' but also help to recognize its essence through the common 
denominators.
2.1.2. From Techne to Technoscience
To go back to its ancient roots, technology is most commonly studied 
with reference to 'techne', the Aristotelian concept that means 
'art' as performed by craftsman in Greek. As it is discernible from 
its ties with the term 'architekton' meaning 'master-producer' 
(Meagher 1988), the term techne used to signify the art and skill 
of the master builder specifically, but more generally it was 
applied to describe the "art of every kind of production" 
(Schadewaldt 1979, 164). Regarding the word 'art' in this sense, 
Aristotle states:
Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some 
by art, some spontaneously... Thus, then, are natural 
products produced; all other productions are called 
'makings'. And all makings proceed either from art or from 
a faculty or from thought (Metaphysics, VII, 7).
According to Aristotle, 'art' or 'technical skill', as it is 
translated in some references, is one of the five qualities through 
which the mind attains truth. The relationship of art and truth is 
due to the process of thought man is involved in carrying out his 
art. Aristotle elucidates this point by discriminating 'making' from 
'doing' or 'acting', and proposing that making involves the
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intention and wilful working of the maker for production (poiesis) 
different from practice (praxis). For making involves higher 
capacity of rational act, he assigns the qualities of making to art: 
Now architectural skill, for instance, is an art, and it is 
also a rational quality concerned with making; nor is there 
any art which is not a rational quality concerned with
making, nor any such quality which is not an art
(Nichomachean Ethics VI, iv, 3).
Consequently, he defines 'techne' as "a state of capacity to make, 
involving a true course of reasoning" (Nichomachean Ethics VI, 4).
For Aristotle, art as being involved in making is interested in 
coming into being, i.e. by following a planned course of action 
through reasoning, art consists of bringing things into existence 
which are not necessarily capable of coming into being themselves. 
Thus, different than things that come into being in nature, art
involves the aim and efforts of the maker to make things come into
being.
This quality of techne that takes human purpose and direction into 
account for the course of making is also emphasized by Webster Hood 
and Daniel Bell in their studies on technology. Referring to techne 
as "cognitive production". Hood explains it as dealing with things 
which are "not necessarily nor have any innate tendency to become 
what they might be, but with things which can be made into other 
things given the action of some human agent" (1972, 348).
Similarly, Bell draws attention to techne for its quality of 
consisting "the conception of the result to be produced before its
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realization in the material" (1991^ 22). These readings of
"techneS following Aristotle's proposition that "...the origin is 
in the maker r not in the thing made" attain priority to human 
purpose and ordering for the productive activity (Nichomachean 
Ethics VI, 4). At the same time, for Aristotle defines 'techne' 
with respect to its difference from nature where things have their 
origin in themselves, the maker seems to attain priority also before 
nature since he can originate activities himself and process nature 
in accordance with his purpose. In this way, techne appears as a 
predetermined productive activity whose origin and control belongs 
to the maker. Thereby, it can be defined as the ordering of nature 
in accordance to a pre-planned aim driven by human purpose and 
reasoning.
This significance of the term 'techne', proclaiming the maker in 
charge of the productive activity as the true possessor of all 
things, can be found to be influential in many attempts to define 
modern technology one of which is proposed by Donald Schon as 
follows:
Any tool or technique, any product or process, any physical 
equipment or method of doing or making, by which human 
capability is extended (qtd. in McGinn 1978, 180).
Although at first hand this definition seems to be intending to 
elaborate the relationship between human being and technology, by 
demanding the extension of human capability for an activity to be 
referred as technology, it also assigns technology the function of 
confirming and guaranteeing the persistence of human authority. 
Similarly, other definitions like "the control of the environment to
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meet human needs" (S. R. Carpenter); or "the cumulative sum of man­
made means to satisfy human needs and desires" (L. R. Markert) 
prerequire the presence of human purpose and ordering for 
technological production (qtd. in Mitcham 1978, 232), (Markert 
1989, 11)· Thus, deriving from Schon's point of departure according 
to which unless the extension of human capability is not guaranteed, 
an activity cannot be counted as technology, one wonders if the 
control of the environment is not maintained or desires are not 
satisfied, man's efforts can be called as technology or not. 
Clearly, these views define technology with respect to the idea of 
the 'origin in the maker'; but by turning the 'origin in the maker' 
into the 'possession of the maker', they tie technology not only to 
the initiation and direction but also to absolute control of the 
maker and affirm that technology can exist only as such.
However, although Aristotle defines techne with respect to nature, 
he does not assign the control over matters strictly to techne. 
Rather than depicting it as opposed to nature; Aristotle on the 
contrary delimits techne with the common qualities of natural 
production:
Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end; therefore 
the nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g. had 
been a thing made by nature, it would have been made in the 
same way as it is now by art; and if things made by nature 
were made also by art, they would come to be in the same 
way as by nature. Each step then in the series is for the 
sake of the next; and generally art partially completes 
what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly imitates 
her (Physics II, 2).
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In his study on technological thought in ancient Greece^ Jean Pierre 
Vernant stresses the difference of human production and natural 
processes by stating that the former resulted from an intelligent 
final causer whereas the latter can result from chance (tuche) and 
without design. Nevertheless, he explains that "...in other respects 
the operation performed by the artisan remains contained within the 
framework of nature; it is not seen as an artificial means to 
'transform nature' and establish a human order" (1983, 260).
Techne was in knowing how and when to use the life-force (dunamis) 
and in this respect there was no distinction between a natural force 
and the use of a manufactured tool. Artisans' activities was 
considered not as a work, but as a service, where rather than the 
manufacture process, the use of the product by its user was crucial 
(Vernant 1983). As Aristotle stresses in Nicomahean Ethics, the 
"efficient cause" of a production "lies in the maker", the maker 
operates on material and gives it form (VI, iv, 4); but the final 
cause of the entire operation is in the final form. The essence of a 
product is unchangeable, uncreated and independent from the maker. 
It is defined by the purpose and the appropriateness of the product 
to the users' needs which is more important than the efficient cause 
by which the product is produced. The essence a flute or a shoe is 
in its perfect adaptation to the user. Thus, the artisan is just a 
means for actualizing the final form; all he does is to recognize 
and actualize a form which is not capable of coming into being 
itself.
Similarly, reviewing the relation of techne and nature in ancient 
Greeks, Schadewaldt explains that for Greeks techne was a process of
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production proceeding in ways analogous to nature, by only 
perfecting what nature cannot bring to a perfection itself (1979). 
Approached from a perspective belonging to their intercourse with 
chance, both nature and techne can even be considered as acting in 
the same manner. As Aristotle quotes from Agathon in Nichomachean 
Ethics stating "art loves chance and chance loves art", techne, like 
nature, is concerned with many unknown variables (VI, 4). A process 
at the end of which the course of things take place because other 
things have happened on the way can be seen both in the way "nature 
generates" and "technique produces" where "by the agency of 
something and out of something a something is realized" (Schadewaldt 
1979, 167). Still, the variables of nature was considered to be 
belonging to a fixed order of things which are not yet knowable, 
whereas the variables of techne did not inspire the existence of a 
particular order at work. For this reason, Schadewaldt evaluates 
techne even as approaching "much nearer to the directing activity of 
nature than to chance" and proposes that techne was conceptualized 
in an intermediary position in between "tyche' (or tuche) -mere 
coincidence or chance, and 'physis' (or phusis) -elementary 
principles and processes of nature (1979, 167). Therefore, it would 
not be wrong to assume that, in Greek thought although techne as the 
perfecting or making use of nature required the mastery of man, it 
was equally open to productive coincidences. Techne was ordering and 
making use of nature as well as 'happy chances'.
On the other hand, Vernant proposes that techne was operating on the 
level of phusis, and defined depending on its contrast with luck or 
chance. But he also explains that, from this, techne should not be 
considered as based on physical laws that involved exact measures or
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precise calculations because such laws were not even existing at 
that time. It is not proper to regard techne as ^applied science' in 
the modern sense^ because it was operating on a different level from 
science, on an approximate ground where things were shifting so that 
neither exact measurements nor calculations were applicable. In 
ancient Greece as reflected in Aristotle's thoughts, science 
(episteme) was conceptualized as dealing with first causes that 
exist always and for the most part, circumscribed by the belief that 
universe contained at a deeper level a constant and regular order. 
Still, even in geometry, they were using a correction factor which 
was called "additosubtraction", to modify the irregularities and 
make approximate adjustments on results (Bailey 1996, 40). In this 
context, Vernant comments that "Greek thought never succeeded in 
closing this gap between, on the one hand, science based on a 
logical ideal, and, on the other, empeiria dependent upon the random 
procedures based on observation" (1983, 289). Likewise, in his 
treatise translated by Susan Murphy, Heron of Alexandria, explains 
the principles in automaton making by using expressions such as, "We 
shall have to determine the lengths of the loops and kinks by 
experiment, because we begin to wind the cord from the spot where 
the base is to stop" (1995, 21). In this respect, Vernant evaluates 
the methods employed for techne and states that they cannot even be 
referred as experimental since they are based on "practical 
knowledge obtained in the course of random gropings" (1983, 285)
Techne, then, can be considered as consisting of making by using 
both the principles of nature and uncalculated intervention of other 
things that are variable. As a matter of fact, although both are 
ways to attain truth and involve true reasoning, Aristotle
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differentiates techne from science because of such variables. Since^ 
science deals with first causes and forms of beings which are 
unchangeable and eternal, it is conceptualized in a prior position 
compared to techne. However, techne deals with variables and 
although the maker initiates and directs the productive activity, 
his methods are never exact.
By initiating and steering the production and by dealing with 
unexpected occurrences he may encounter on the way, the maker is 
still the one who is responsible for the whole process. But to do 
so, he has to involve his insight and individual experience as well 
as his knowledge on certain principles and rules. As he encounters 
different variables, he has to find appropriate methods. That is 
why, the methods belonging to techne are never exact and rather than 
being a controlled activity, it is on the contrary, an activity 
where the maker strives for control.
This separation between techne and science explicit in Aristotle's 
philosophy continues to be transposed into a more concrete form in 
the Middle Ages and even in Renaissance as manifested in the 
separation of artisans' and thinkers' social status. The term 'art' 
was now being used in the form of either 'mechanical', 'practical', 
or 'useful' arts; but its lack of methodical rules and education 
sustained by its experimental and random looking nature have lead 
the way to an explicit division where the inferior part was suited 
to its share. Willis H. Truitt explains the point as:
Between 1300 and 1600 there were three levels of 
intellectual activity in the urban centers of southern 
Europe. These activities were conducted by university
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scholars^ humanists, and artisans. The first two of these 
groups were trained in logical disputation and their 
methods tended to be abstract, rhetorical and exegetical. 
The university scholars and humanist literati marked a very 
sharp distinction between liberal and mechanical arts. They 
despised manual labour, experimentation, and dissection. 
(1978, 124).
During the Renaissance, in spite of many radical changes in life, 
the common conceptualization of practical arts and artisans remained 
the same in ways physicians tried to dissociate themselves from 
surgeons or architects from engineers who were considered to be low- 
class artisans. This is illustrated best in the works of monk 
Abelard who by referring to crafts people wrote that "those who 
concerned themselves with action might accomplish useful things, but 
were in principle no different from beasts which are sound in 
practice but ignorant of nature and cause (qtd. in Birdsall 1980, 
135) .
The lack of confidence on the scientific ground towards practical 
arts was challenged soon in the seventeenth century by Galileo. With 
his invention of the telescope, Galileo filled in the gap between 
practical arts and science for he simply showed that to attain truth 
no deeper intellectual activity or logical analysis of ideas but a 
pair of lenses could be enough. By providing a "technological 
availability" he introduced the idea of "using instruments to find 
out things beyond the reach of the natural senses, and not deducible 
by mere brain power (Price 1986, 246).
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As a matter of fact^ Galileo's real contribution was to science. 
Although he did not challenge the classical belief in the fixed 
order of things, by declaring that "he cared more about small facts 
which could be tested than about the great questions which could be 
neither proved or solved", he questioned the valued methods of 
science and proposed instead an instrumental reasoning by using 
measurements and relations to explore the order of the universe 
(Birdsall 1980, 137). In the mathematical universe of Galileo, to 
arrive at facts and principles, practical arts provided the 
appropriate means. In this way, he brought practical arts closer to 
science and science towards a new philosophy.
The new philosophy in science found its voice with Francis Bacon who 
insisted on the union of science and mechanical arts for obtaining 
test and proof, therefore correct understanding of nature. By 
proposing that "the true end of knowledge is not the pleasure of the 
mind but a line and race of inventions that may in some degree 
subdue and overcome the necessities and miseries of humanity", he 
tried to compel attention to the use of mechanical arts for 
attaining true knowledge and consequently emphasised the strong need 
for the collaboration of scientists and artisans (Birdsall 1980, 
137). For Bacon, the difference between basic and applied science 
did not even exist, because he saw applied science itself as basic 
(Bell 1991). Thus, his efforts on the formation of an experimental 
science not only signalled the birth of today's modern science, but 
also helped to raise awareness for the essential place of mechanical 
arts in the upcoming order.
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Mechanical arts, therefore in this way, had the chance to get 
partially liberated from its meanings belonging to crafts and trade 
and stood as a necessary component of science. As representatives of 
the ways to achieve the knowledge of truth that is proved to be 
exact, mechanical arts and their instruments signified a gateway to 
the mathematical order of the universe, expressed by Descartes as "I 
recognize no difference between the machines made by craftsmen and 
the diverse bodies put together by nature alone" (Birdsall 1980, 
98). This transformation of the notion of practical arts and its 
collaboration with science gave way to a new set of discoveries. 
Medieval inventions like clock whose correctness usually had to be 
checked with sundials or clepsydras have left their place to 
precision instruments of measurement like the pendulum, microscope 
or thermostat. At the end of such developments, even The Royal 
Society of London had to ask a group of its members to study the 
history of artisan trades (Birdsall 1980).
Though this last attempt can be considered as a step towards the 
institutionalization and specialization of mechanical arts, this did 
not take start until the late eighteenth century. With the advent of 
Industrial Revolution a new span of development conducted by the new 
machine power have emerged. While, inventions like steam engine or 
assembly line were influential in drawing the standards of a new way 
of living, instrumental rationality and its instruments have become 
synonymous with the idea of progress. Especially with the appearance 
of large scale technological systems like the railway or the 
factory, the notion of mechanical arts have left itself to the 
notion of 'technology' in the modern sense of the term, soon around 
mid nineteenth century. As Leo Marx explains, although the term
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technology have been used if rarely from the seventeenth century 
onwards, it was in order to refer merely to technical discourses and 
treatises. Its extensive use in the modern sense coincided with the 
year 1859 where R. F. Burton applied the tenn in order to refer 
directly to "practical arts collectively" including both the "actual 
practice and practitioners" (1995, 17). Nevertheless, as he again 
explains deriving from Arnold Toynbee's lectures in between 1880-81 
who have preferred to use terms like "mechanical discoveries", 
"machinery", "mechanical improvements", or "factory system", the 
term technology did not spread into current use very quickly and had 
to wait twenty years more when Veblen this time suggested that 
"machine technology was the distinguishing feature of modernity" 
(1995, 18).
The improvements like the steam engine that appeared due to the 
efforts in the technological rather than the scientific domain,
actively participated and locomoted the Industrial Revolution, and 
inescapably carried out such productive activities into a more
privileged position. While, on the one hand, technology as
reinforced with the enthusiasm of industrialization continued its 
qualities synonymous with what is exact, true and necessary to 
control and master nature, on the other hand, by obtaining a dynamic 
structure and widespread areas of application, it became the symbol 
of progress, modernity and universality. In this new system
propelled by efficiency, production was no more bound to a specific 
group of activities named mechanical arts, but became a matter of 
'technology' that captured a larger and broader milieu, -the life 
itself. The term 'technology' with its abstract and more general 
signification compared to mechanical arts, now could be used in
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distant disciplines from military to medicine or electronics to 
genetics, both for means i.e·, tools and machines, and for processes 
i,e., productive action (Marx 1995). As a consequence of these 
developments, in the twentieth century we arrive at the definition 
of technology as follows:
Technology is the instrumental ordering of human experience 
within a logic of efficient means, and the direction of 
nature to use its powers for material gain (Bell 1991, 
20) .
Technology, as being introduced to standard methods and high 
capacity production with the advent of Industrial Revolution, 
consequently entered a faster span of development. With exponential 
growth, standing now as a subject of study not only for specialized 
large corporations but also for universities, it gained access 
towards a self-standing status. While in this fashion technology 
continued its way penetrating into all possible layers of life, 
today it arrived at a level of domination where rather than standing 
as a modest component, integrated science into its own formation. 
Technological activities are still conceptualized as consisting of 
ordering and direction depending on determined goals in continuation 
with Jacques Ellul's 1964 definition of la technique:
... the translation into action of man's concern to master 
things by means of reason, to account for what is 
subconscious, make quantitative what is qualitative, make 
clear and precise the outlines of nature, take hold of 
chaos and put order into it (qtd. in Bell 1992, 27).
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Nevertheless, as also Ellul's approach signal with its ambiguity 
about whether he is referring to the objectives of four hundred 
years of scientific activity or modern technology, in the 
contemporary world the border in between technology and science has 
eminently eroded giving way to new 'technoscientific' order and a 
new 'technoculture'. In the past, technology was employed for 
predetermined problems according to predetermined purposes. But it 
is now the purpose itself and an active ingredient of the social 
life. Once it existed because of the practical necessities of life, 
now, it is a necessity simply because it exists. Although the notion 
of control still adheres to technology, what is to be controlled is 
not merely nature anymore; because "economic, technical, political, 
organic, historical, mythic and textual threads... make up the 
tissues" of the new technological order or "technoscience" (Haraway 
1997, 68). As a result of this merging of previously separate 
categories, it can now be argued that:
...technologies, nature, and culture are all intertwined, 
not just in practice but ontologically. Thus, technologies 
are deployed, but they also employ and engage human beings 
and nature in such a manner that a continuity among the 
three arises that prevents any essentialist isolations of 
one from the other. That is, a subject cannot be defined 
simply as a human being. To be a subject is to be natural- 
cultural-technological; to be a social-animal is to be 
techno-social (Menser and Aronowitz 1996, 21).
This merging of science, technology and culture indicates an ever 
increasing expansion and integration of technology into a broader 
social ground, but paradoxically it is also more than ever dependent
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on expertise and expert knowledge that is almost impossible to be 
attained by mere opinion. The transformation of technology from its 
moderate status into a powerful enterprise emphasizes a distance by 
also transforming the rate of growth into a level of overgrowth 
exploding into the depths of every field with intense pressure. The 
current gap in our everyday relation with technology is considered 
to be related with the difficulty to keep up with its exponential 
growth and specialization. Nevertheless, this also gives way to the 
now familiar technological pessimism that searches for resolution in 
ending the course of its growth itself. Referring technological 
development as an "extreme phenomena" which represents "no longer 
change, but a passage through the limit", Baudrillard, therein, 
forecasts its fate by stating "we encounter a paradoxical logic 
according to which an idea ends with its own excess, its own 
realization" (1998). However, the distance is still there, and there 
is no limit other than pseudo Year 2000 crises which can suspend 
things to make it possible for us to catch up with change. As 
technology extends into life changing it at each new step, every 
layer exposed to its influence motivates it further. Still, no mere 
opinion knows how to deal with this ever-growing influence.
Today, technology is still conceptualized as a means of command and 
control but by being moulded into a form of imperative, it has 
become the prerequisite of the day, even the prerequisite of being 
referred to as a 'subject'. Whether it is a means of control or 
rather we still strive for the control of it, is not clear in this 
technoscientific order yet; but if one thing is clear, it is that 
technology now signifies 'being in this world'.
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2.2. The Guides of Technology
2.2.1. Technological Knowledge
Following the scope of history, from techne to technoscience I have 
tried to evaluate the shifts in the notion of technology and the 
corresponding attempts to answer the question 'What is technology?'. 
Thus, with the passing time, technological activities and
subsequently the notion of technology can be recognized as changing 
according to the constraints determined by the concurrent settings. 
Nevertheless, the consequent technological order can determine new 
constraints and reshape the concurrent present, in turn. Still, in 
spite of the span of change produced by this cycle, the notion of 
technology continues to involve human purpose and its direction. 
But, in spite of the interaction of social and cultural settings to 
this span of change, our present seems to get hardly synchronized 
with the present of technology. As technology proceeds forward, an 
invisible distance produces a gap for us to challenge.
"I fear none of the existing machines, what I fear is the 
extraordinary rapidity with which they are becoming something very 
different to what they are at present. No class of beings have in 
any time past made so rapid a movement forward" writes Samuel Butler 
in Erewhon in 1872, as being a witness of the consequences of the 
Industrial Revolution (145; ch. 23). The gaps that could be filled 
with the 'insight of the maker' once, along with the advent of 
technology grew deeper in a way they cannot be challenged forth 
easily. Yet, in order to keep up with this technological order they 
must be encountered since we cannot altogether abolish technology 
like they do in Erewhon.
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Together with its fast span, the self regulating, institutionalized 
character of the contemporary technology has turned into a field of 
expert knowledge and enclosed itself to common understanding. 
Although, a house by an architect can give an idea to the user about 
the knowledge that constructed it, simply by using a computer it is 
impossible to attain the knowledge that conducted its making. Since, 
a special and intricate type of knowledge conducts technology now, 
as Lyotard discusses, we are faced with "the exteriorization of 
knowledge with respect to the 'knower'" (1984, 4). This 
nevertheless problematizes the nature of knowledge that conducts 
technology if we are to reduce the distance in between. To clarify 
'how technology operates', therefore, the type of knowledge 
technological activities are conducted should be explored first. If 
technology is "the organization of knowledge for the achievement of 
practical purposes" as E. Mesthene argues, in order to be able to 
explain 'what is technology' more precisely, it is necessary to 
inspect this specific 'organization of knowledge' (qtd. in McGinn 
1978, 180).
In an article, Daniel Bell defines knowledge as the "organized set 
of statements of fact or ideas, presenting a reasoned judgement or 
an experimental result, which is transmitted to others through some 
communicative medium in some systematic form" (1979, 168). In his
definition of technology, then, he emphasizes human experience, as 
the type of knowledge that conducts technological activities. Human 
experience as an input is rudimentary for the productive activity 
that is even inherent in the notion of 'techne'. However, it is 
potent in ways that arrives at practical solutions, but alone is not 
capable of governing high technology. Though it was presumably
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effective in the invention of the wheel or the windmill^ human 
experience solely cannot construct a computer system itself. 
Therefore, although human experience forms a type of knowledge that 
steers productive activity, it is not complete but in need of some 
external assistance.
In "Technology and the Structure of Knowledge", I. C. Jarvie 
identifies technology itself as a form of knowledge and suggests 
that it is dependent, therefore guided primarily by scientific 
knowledge (1972). Depicting technology as 'know-how', he 
discriminates it from science or 'know-that' based on the difference 
between their concerns as the search of truth and effectiveness 
respectively. He proposes that although both science and technology 
are indispensable from each other, science deals with the 'truth', 
where technology seeks for efficiency which can but need not be true 
at all. Stated differently, technology or know-how tries to manage 
to do things in a part of the world whereas science targets the 
entire world to find and set the rules about it. In this regard, 
Jarvie concludes that "technological knowledge is the knowledge 
within the boundary of circle... which coincides with the laws of 
science" (1972, 58-59).
As Jarvie introduces the term 'technological knowledge', he takes 
another step by expressing that on a broad level it is based on 
scientific knowledge. Science leads the way to suggest what is 
possible, and it is within these boundaries that technology evolves 
and in turn nourishes science through filling its gaps by providing 
new knowledge. With his approach, Jarvie does not eliminate human 
experience totally as the term 'know-how' signifies, but
36
circumscribing it with science, he proposes science as generating 
the determining knowledge which conducts technological activities· 
As a matter of fact, such an approach emphasizing the predomination 
of scientific knowledge is widely accepted as can be understood from 
certain definitions which suggest that "Technological or 
experimental development is the use of scientific knowledge in order 
to produce new or substantially improved materials, devices, 
products, processes, systems or services" (Richards 1987, 112). 
Apart from expanding the nature of knowledge prevalent in 
technology, such propositions confirm the relationship of science 
and technology by stating "Technology is the application of 
scientific knowledge to practical tasks by organizations that 
involve people and machines" (Naughton 1992, 4).
However, these successive views that depict technology strictly as 
operating on a ground outlined by science, with their tendency to 
get rid of other possible components from this ground gradually give 
rise to a sharp division that maintains "science is what is, while 
technology is what can be as a result of science" (Markert 1989, 
12). Consequently, by placing science at the centre of attention, 
they tend to reject 'technological knowledge' as a term or a subject 
worth for studying. Even though these definitions attempt to 
formulate the general concept of technology, it is worth considering 
what kind of scientific knowledge was applied when human being for 
the first time hold a spear, or carved a wheel or wrote down the 
first letter of the alphabet in history.
If such developments can not be explained based on their scientific 
backgrounds, they can at least be understood by referring to the
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Heideggerian notion that depicts technology as grounded in the 
'being of man' (Hood, 1972). As Hood compares, Heidegger with this 
view, contravenes the Aristotelian conception that positions techne 
as something external to man, something other than himself. In this 
respect, it seems, rather than creating a tool for man, science gave 
order and attributed coherence to a reserve which is already 
inhabiting man himself. In this sense, it can be proposed that, 
before the idea of science as the dominator of technology had 
spread, science was after exploring technology, -that is, how and 
with what means human being processed and utilized nature.
The definitions which put forward the dominance of science over 
technology through conceptualizing technology as the application of 
it, actually developed with the 'Scientific Revolution', in the 
writings of Francis Bacon, Galileo and Descartes. While Francis 
Bacon exalted science as the mere source of knowledge and spread 
this world view in his writings, Galileo and Descartes both as 
mathematicians and philosophers believed that everything in nature 
could be deduced from a mathematical format and sought ways for the 
demystification of nature. Although, their concept of new science 
sustained by instrumental reasoning emphasized the virtues of 
mechanical arts for obtaining tests and proofs, inescapably by 
utilizing different techniques for the sake of itself, established 
technology as its component. In their efforts towards the 
mathematization of the universe, mechanical arts provided the 
transmission from qualities to the abstract order of quantities, but 
the factual aim was creating a new order, a new mathematical science 
as the source of everything as Descartes has declared:
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...there must be some general science to explain that 
element as a whole which gives rise to problems about order 
and measurement^ restricted as these were to no special 
subject matter. This, I perceived, was called universal 
mathematics...To speak freely, I am convinced that it is a 
more powerful instrument of knowledge than any other that 
has been bequeathed to us by human agency, as being the 
source of all others (qtd. in Bell 1991, 11).
The seventeenth century efforts to cause reason to prevail and 
manifest the absoluteness of science found its reflections on 
popular ground soon by the nineteenth century. In 1833, the third 
annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science gathered with the aim of creating a new body that will unite 
inventions, technological progress and chemical arts. Although, any 
ideology proclaiming the superiority of science over practical arts 
was not established yet, it took its start on this occasion with the 
ideas of William Whewell who would going to coin the term 
"scientist' later in 1834: "Art has ever been the mother of science; 
but science was a daughter of a far loftier and serener beauty" 
(Cahan 1996) (Layton 1992, 15).
It is also in the nineteenth century that with such developments two 
terms as 'abstract (pure) science' and 'applied science' have 
appeared in order to refer to science and technology respectively. 
Along with this categorization, the general tendency was to depict 
abstract science as the true governor of the revolution as it is 
conveyed in a speech by Lyon Playfair after the 1851 Great 
Exhibition: "...the cultivators of abstract science, the searchers
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after truth for truth's sake are·.^ the 'horses' of the chariot of 
industry" (qtd· in Layton 1991, 15)·
Likewise, Herman Von Helmholtz during one of his lectures in 1854 
explains the properties of work done by a force by examining the 
inventions of the era like the air-gun or the steam engine· Therein, 
he proposes that a perpetual motion that makes use of mechanical 
force could only be applied following the establishment of this law 
"by the great mathematicians of the last century", after "bewildered 
and ill-instructed people" (1995, 24)· Helmholtz, then, reviews
steam-engine on the basis of the laws of combustion, explaining the 
chemical reaction of oxygen and carbon and the force it exerts upon, 
and in this way, tries to ground this climacteric invention of the 
Industrial Revolution on a scientific basis.
The way Helmholtz puts the steam engine, and in general all 
technological inventions under the roof of scientific knowledge is 
representative of the common demeanour that even persists today. 
Nevertheless, this opinion also encounters strong objection. In this 
aspect, science historian Derek De Solla Price asserts that in 
contrast to the common belief that depicts the direction of 
influence from basic to applied science, in history its examples are 
rare and in actuality technological advancements are the causes of 
scientific knowledge. As he states, "thermodynamics owes much more 
to the steam engine than ever the steam engine owed to 
thermodynamics". Therefore, Price argues that new techniques and 
technologies depend on know-how without even understanding the know- 
why; but when we succeed to understand how a technique works we go 
for modifications and improvements which gives the wrong impression
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that science and technology succeed together (1996^ 240). For 
Price, although science and technology share a common point for 
using similar methods or techniques, the latter is never the 
application of the former.
In correspondence to Price's conclusion, Howard P. Segal in his 
study of the New Liberal Arts program, upholds the distinction and 
ascribes technology as independent and "highly intellectual 
enterprise" in itself. To provide an explanation, then, he refers to 
the New Liberal Arts program:
Science is discovery, engineering is design. Scientists 
study the natural, engineers create the artificial. 
Scientists create general theories out of observed data; 
engineers make things, often using only very approximate 
theories. Engineer's primary motive for design is the 
creation of an object that works (1994, 206).
From this much, it can be proposed that technology involves and 
therefore is conducted with a separate and complex body of knowledge 
which will not be wrong to be referred as technological knowledge. 
This type of knowledge utilises similar means with science, but is 
actually different in ways it consists of certain elements which is 
problematic in terms of exactness such as the human experience, or 
insight. Characterized with the term know-how, technological 
knowledge, like the activity itself, is not destined for the search 
of the truth but to the optimum ways of solving some solid problems. 
As its drive is efficiency, technological knowledge can be assumed 
to be the knowledge of efficiency in general.
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More specifically^ Robert McGinn delineates technological knowledge 
as arising inductively from acquaintance or experiments rather than 
deductively from science. Therein, he analyses its three components 
as 'knowing how to do', 'knowledge of resources', and knowledge of 
methods' (1978). The first one, 'knowing how to do' which he 
deliberately differentiates from 'know-how', involves making 
generalizations like "if P (is done), then Q (happens or can be 
done)" (186). Although, 'knowing how to do' can be supported with 
the insight, McGinn argues that it is not a non-intellectual 
knowledge like know-how, but on the contrary a way of achieving new 
intellectual knowledge. The second component, 'knowledge of 
resources' deals especially with energy, materials and their 
properties and allows the prediction of the behaviour of other types 
of resources. Finally, the 'knowledge of methods' involves the 
knowledge of which direction to take in order to achieve the desired 
result of the activity. In this respect, from trial-and-error to 
more formal methods, anything that is appropriate for obtaining the 
highest efficiency is at stake. As McGinn explains, "technological 
activity generally proceeds through its various stages in a 
nonarbitrary order, one not dictated primarily by the law of nature, 
but by the exigencies of fabrication and the desire to realize a 
successful outcome" (187).
In the same manner with McGinn, yet in a comparatively extensive 
analysis, Carl Mitcham proposes an elaborate classification of the 
components of technological knowledge which he discusses in four 
groups. These are: (a) Unconscious sensorimotor awareness of how to 
make or use some artifact, (b) Technical maxims or rules of thumb of 
prescientific work, (c) Descriptive laws or nomopragmatic
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statements, and (d) Technological theories (1978, 256)· In this
scheme, the first type of knowledge involves intuitive learning by 
looking at former examples or learning under the guidance of a 
mentor by apprenticeship. The second one is constituted by the 
attempts to make generalizations for successful making, and also 
accommodates heuristic strategies of problem solving. Although the 
use of technical maxims or rules of thumb recalls 'knowing how to 
do' discussed by McGinn, their attributes are different. They are 
not dependent on experience but on the contrary require the ability 
to foresee the probable solutions before trying them one by one. 
Mitcham argues that in order to arrive at generalizations like 'If A 
then B', there has to be some concrete reference to an experience. 
This, nevertheless belongs to the field of 'descriptive laws or 
nomopragmatic statements' in the third category that can also be 
referred to as empirical laws. Being experimental, they employ 
prescriptive knowledge for an action but are different from 
scientific knowledge for they do not consist of a theoretical 
framework. 'Technological theories', on the other hand, either 
employ scientific theories to applications like the theory of flight 
which is the application of fluid dynamics, or work directly on 
actual operative complexes like men-machine systems. The former 
group of activities can be referred as "substantive technological 
theories", or simply as 'applied science', whereas the latter is 
called "Operative technological theories" (1978, 256). In general,
both groups of 'technological theories' are concerned with the 
methodical formation of a theoretical background to conduct 
technological activities.
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Mitcham's analysis is valuable for it systematically involves all 
the aforementioned components of technological knowledge from 
insight to assumptions and from human experience to scientific 
knowledge. Nevertheless^ another aspect belonging to the body of 
technological knowledge is still lacking.
In the complex network of technology today, technological knowledge 
as well as explaining how to use technology also insists that we 
must use it. In its totality, technological knowledge is said to be 
employed in order to use and make use of technology but in this 
saying it is also connoted that technology is for use therefore it 
should definitely be used. Technological knowledge on one hand 
secures the presence of technology without questioning. While, on 
the other hand, it manifests itself necessary to conduct it. In his 
analysis, Carl Mitcham also arrives at the conclusion that 
technological knowledge practically aims at control and
manipulation. However, this gives the false impression that if this 
knowledge is maintained everything can be controlled and conducted. 
There are still accidents throughout technology; moreover they can 
be turned into methods as in the case of hackers who continuously 
create accidents in and out of the computer. If technological 
knowledge is responsible for controlling which is necessary for more 
efficiency, then which one of its components permit the use of 
technology in the opposite direction to both mis or dysfunction? 
Instinct? Heuristics? In its context, even if it can be argued that 
hackers put technological knowledge to use in order to conduct 
things in their own manner, the discourse on technological knowledge 
argues for a consequent effective production which is never the 
purpose in case of hackers.
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The discourse on technological knowledge manifests technology as an 
activity for control and productivity, but such 'accidents' float 
insistently to the surface like a slip of tongue. With its 
components, technological knowledge obviously conducts technology, 
but there seems another type of knowledge concealed beneath this 
discourse which equally provides a guide to understand how 
technology works.
As a matter of fact, when we go back and re-evaluate the division of 
technology and science, it can be seen that the relationship of 
science with knowledge is one of generating, but technology is one 
of concealing. Science has to generate knowledge for more knowledge; 
but technology has to conceal knowledge for more technology. For 
this reason, e.g., one can never be sure of the right time to 
purchase a new technological product, because every time a system is 
updated the next series waits in line, the design of which are
already completed and the qualities of which are strictly
confidential. Respectively, the advertising slogan that has turned 
into a common idiom for the 'products of latest technology' is
nothing but the marketing of this secret knowledge. If the final aim 
of the technological knowledge is efficiency, then for the 
effectiveness of any technological production, the knowledge that 
conducts technology as a part of a market strategy has to be 
concealed. For this reason technological knowledge definitely has an 
economic dimension. Other than that, it also has political,
historical, scientific, or mythic values which are not readily 
explicit in its discourse.
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Technological knowledge^ therefore^ in spite of its concluded 
constitution, conceals a particular 'knowledge of technology' that 
also conducts and sustains our everyday relationship with technology 
from users to hackers. The 'knowledge of technology' must be a 
component but with its invisibility it is the lacking part of 
technological knowledge. This lack nevertheless creates gaps but 
technological knowledge itself does not provide any means to 
overcome them.
Technological knowledge equips us with appropriate tools to control 
technology but its mode of ordering is strictly instrumental and 
depicts the essence of technology as technological. For this reason, 
the distance between technology and its everyday users cannot be 
overcome through merely attaining technological knowledge. In order 
to be able to govern technology truly it is necessary to know 'what 
is technology'. Therefore, to close the distance in between, 
'knowledge of technology' is necessary because it is the knowledge 
that circumscribes and understands technology as a whole as being 
concerned with 'whatness' of technology.
Hence, the essence of technology starts to disclose itself in 
knowing the aspects of technological knowledge in relation to the 
'knowledge of technology'. Since the knowledge of technology is the 
knowledge of the essence of technology it requires to depict 
technology with all its components. In this respect, following 
technological knowledge, it is also necessary to study the purpose 
of technology because the essence of technology is to be revealed in 
the aim to which technological knowledge is put.
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2.2.2. The Purpose of Technology
Various definitions of technology make clear that the purpose of 
technology is to control the environment. Whether the subject is 
production efficiency or the satisfaction of other human needs^ 
technology serves as a means for control. Nevertheless, by drawing 
the boundaries of technology in this manner, a paradoxical situation 
appears. If the aim of technology is control, then what conducts car 
accidents, computer crash-downs, or wars? If this lack of control is 
still a part of technology, these extreme situations are not 
communicated by its definition. If not, then once again, what is 
technology?
Even if the aim of technology is to control, it is difficult to 
control technology itself. Each time technology is applied for a 
specific task, it serves to control a particular situation but it 
also causes some changes to the existing standards of the 
environment. As a result, another technology becomes necessary to 
control the new circumstances. For example, when technology provided 
the control of large distances by cars, cars became a part of our 
habitual environment and technology was now necessary to control 
cars. When traffic systems were provided, technology was up to 
controlling a wider transit range with more speed. Then, from radars 
to highways a chain of technological productions poured down one 
after another in order to control the consequences of the former 
step at each time. When it is to control something a particular 
technology is employed, but in order to control the outcome of that 
particular technology another technology is called for action which 
will apparently require another one in the similar order, and that 
goes ad infinitum. As a result, there arises a technological pattern
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in which everything is connected to the other for some more control. 
But the last stage of this pattern is not yet in sight. The truth 
is^ this pattern will never be complete because technology is driven 
by this ambiguous tension.
The more we want to control, the more technology we require. 
Technology cannot control everything all at once, but it is the only 
means to control things in practice and every time we demand for 
control, new technologies have to be created. The continuous 
appearance of new technologies maintain a progressive outlook, 
however, it seems the ratio between the things that can and cannot 
be controlled with technology remains constant. Although technology 
produces new techniques continuously, the gap created by the absence 
of control stays the same. The lack of technological knowledge is 
also a component of this gap, since its absence emphasizes the lack 
of control more. But even if this knowledge is obtained there will 
still be a lack of control, and a gap thereafter; because our 
distance to technology, the distance between the controllable and 
the uncontrollable is the motor of technology that propels it 
further. Our technological system has to hold this distance in order 
to continue.
Using the term 'keeping up with' in order to refer to our 
relationship with technology is not very appropriate, we are rather 
arrested in a mode of approaching technology. Our distance to 
technology is the pressure that pushes it further. Therefore 
technology does not have an end and its having no end is its 
operating force. But at the same time to know that it does not have 
an end, is an end in itself.
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Heidegger who proposes this closed-end view (Motzkin 1994)^ 
therein, argues that the essence of technology is not technological 
(Heidegger 1993). Technology justifies itself with its ever- 
increasing productivity which promises to ascend exponentially till 
eternity. But, as it reveals, in this way, it also conceals. 
Although people use technology to control reserves, the order of 
technology that is captivated with control identifies everything as 
a reserve including man himself. For Heidegger, man as being 
occupied with more control, underestimates the Beingness of his 
being. Following Heidegger, Marcuse visualizes technology as a fo m  
of ideology where "the drive to conquer Nature becomes a self- 
justifying goal", so that "individuals sacrifice their human 
possibilities to the maintenance of that very system" (Zimmerman 
1979, 252).
In its instrumental scheme, technology involves and orients people 
towards control and seems to reveal by way of making. However, the 
essence of technology is not technological. Its instrumental scheme 
conceals that technology's having no end is an end in itself and it 
proceeds by putting a distance to its essence. Its essence is that, 
technology reveals, but as it manifests to reveal, it conceals, thus 
continues its way in this revealing and concealing. Therefore, "The 
question concerning technology is the question concerning the 
constellation in which revealing and concealing, in which the coming 
to presence of truth comes to pass" (Heidegger 1993, 315).
When it comes to our subject concerning the relation of present 
technology and design, the situation is more or less similar. Every 
designer expends enormous efforts to keep up with the last
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technological innovations, but generally none of them tries to 
elaborate the digital mode of designing, knowing that the last will 
never last· The present medium for being relatively new presents a 
considerable challenge for designers. But, designers rather than 
questioning what or how they design, challenge the instruments of 
technology. As Heidegger suggests, "So long as we represent 
technology as an instriament, we remain transfixed in the will to 
master it" (1993, 314). Designers, nevertheless in their challenge 
with the new medium, search for the latest software, filters, 
extensions, and other instrumental accessories of the same kind to 
obtain the knowledge they need to overcome their lack of control. 
But the knowledge they seek for is not in these products of recent 
technology. The knowledge is in realizing that technology's having 
no end is an end in itself. The knowledge is in seeing that, the 
instrumental ordering of technology reveals but at the same time 
avoids to see the essence of things. And the knowledge is that, this 
rhythm of technology hinders designers to think about the aspects of 
digital design. As a result, it is now time to cease tracking the 
development of technology and study the structure of the new medium 
and its consequences on design.
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3. COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
Anyone who thinks science fiction 
is about the future is being naive. 
Science fiction doesn't predict the 
future; it determines itr colonizes 
it^ preprograms it in the image of 
the present.
William Gibson
3.1. Tools and Machines:
Extensions of Manual Action Versus Extensions of Autonomous Operation
within an instrumental scheme, technology is defined as the 
cumulative sum of man-made means employed for attaining certain 
goals. The depiction of technology solely as a 'means for ends', 
inescapably envisions both technology and its objects as an 
instrument, or simply as a tool. In this order, in spite of its 
simplicity, the term 'tool' comes to present somehow a slippery 
concept. On one hand, technology itself is considered to be a tool; 
on the other hand, 'tool', being an integral part of technology can 
be used to address all kinds of different techniques like utensils, 
machines, or more complicated systems. From a plain hammer to a 
multi-functional blender, from vehicles to industrial machines, 
people tend to refer every instrument of action as a 'tool'.
Computers take their share from this simplified world view, as well. 
Linda Rae Markert, with her comment that "computers are our newest 
and most sophisticated 'tools' to make further attempts to 
comprehend the true meaning of life and human existence", underlines
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a common understanding (1989^ 411). Moreover^ such tendency to 
regard computers as 'another tool' is reflected also by their 
designs themselves. Softwares, -the metonymy of computers, 
especially the ones designated for image processing, accommodate a 
'toolbox' as a constant in order to guide primary operations. 
However, amazingly aside from the general conception of the computer 
as a tool, in daily language computers are frequently referred as 
'machines'. John Barry even proposes that the term "machine' stands 
almost as a synonym for computers today (Barry 1993).
Knowing such perversions in the meaning of tool and machine due to 
their interchangeable misuse, one might consider that it is natural 
to mix up principally two different concepts especially in an age 
where our preexisting categories cease to preserve their subjective 
borderlines. However, in order to be able to position computers in 
our technological evolution and discuss their nature concealed in 
their construction, the discrimination between tool and machine 
should be made. As they are the factors responsible for providing 
both a theoretical and a practical ground for the evolution of 
computers, the realization and comprehension of the difference 
between the nature of tools and machines or between the "instruments 
of manual action' and the "instruments of autonomous operation' 
would consequently help to explore the present consequences of 
computers.
In this sense, one of the pioneers who have investigated the nature 
of the "tool' was Alfred Espinas in 1890's. In his attempt to 
reverse the Cartesian view of "human as machine' to 'machine as 
human', Georges Cangiulhem discusses that Espinas explained the
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construction of first tools based on the theory of organic 
extensions by Ernst Kapp (1992). "Earliest tools were simply 
extensions of moving human organs. The flinty the club, the lever 
extend and magnify the organic movement of the arm and its ability 
to strike" (1992, 61).
The contemporary reflections of this view, no doubt, is to be found 
in Marshall McLuhan's study of media, -"the extensions of man" 
(1987). Herein, McLuhan without discriminating tools for their own 
sake, considers all techniques as the extensions of our physical 
beings. However, partially in contrast to Espinas' view, McLuhan 
proposes that tools are extensions of a unique function of an organ 
devoid of any movement. When the 'organ in movement' is extended we 
do not come up with the tools but instead with machines. McLuhan 
develops his definition of machine, then, by remarking this 
difference between the tools and the machines:
As contrasted with the mere tool, the machine is an 
extension or outering of a process. The tool extends the 
fist, the nails, the teeth, the arm. The wheel extends the 
feet in rotation or sequential movement. Printing, the 
first complete mechanization of a handicraft, breaks up the 
movement of the hand into a series of discrete steps that 
are as repeatable as the wheel is rotary (1987, 152).
In this way, McLuhan combines the evolution of machines to tools by 
setting a frame in which machines depend on the repetitive 
reorganization of an organ and its movement in sequence. This 
organic evolution, for McLuhan, not only illuminates the passage
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from tools to machines/ but essentially covers the entire 
development of all our extensions, thus gaining them an 
interdependent character· It is in this context then, McLuhan 
objects to Lewis Mumford's idea that the notion of wheel came 
originally from observing that rolling a log was easier than shoving 
it. Instead McLuhan proposes that log-rolling is closer to the 
rotary movement of the feet on potter's wheel rather than spindle 
operation of the hands which could have never been translated into 
the technology of wheel.
The wheel under the sledge was an accelerator for the feet, 
not of hand. With this acceleration of the feet came the 
need for road, just as with the extension of our backside 
in the form of chair, came the need for table. The wheel is 
an ablative absolute of feet, as chair is the ablative 
absolute of backside (1987, 184).
In a similar fashion, when we examine, for instance the telephone, 
it can be seen that in pictograms it is still represented by 
emphasizing its circular dial in the middle with a pair of 
receivers. This diagram gives the impression that the hand that 
dials the phone stands as a reference in the development of the 
telephone. However, as the present form of this technique clarifies, 
the evolution is not in the continuation of the hand that rotates 
the dial. It is neither in the hand that grabs and holds the phone 
in between mouth and ear. Telephone is the ablative absolute of the 
ear and the mouth themselves which can in that way be transposed 
into stockbrokers' head mounted phones. Thus, in McLuhan's sense, 
'ablative absolute' signifies the initial reference of a technique
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which cannot always be clearly observed in its operation or 
representation.
Apart from defining the formation of tool and machine, McLuhan 
considers them almost as natural parts of the human body that 
indispensably come into being parallel to its functions- This idea, 
reinforced by the term 'ablative absolute', gives us the sense of 
extension as a unit of command, as controllable as any organic part 
of the body. Actually, the term 'extension' itself involves the idea 
of being under control since any extension should necessarily have a 
source, an origin from which it is directed and destined. McLuhan 
identifies this source as the human being, by proposing that 
although tool and machine differ in their ability for autonomous 
movement, they are both extensions originating from the human body. 
Altogether, this brings us to the conclusion that David Bolter 
arrives: "Technology may be regarded largely as the controlled 
application of power" (1993, 17).
However, with the concept of 'autoamputation' that he introduces, 
McLuhan puts the presumption which enframes tools and machines as 
controllable units, under suspicion: "Any invention or technology is 
an extension or self-amputation of our physical bodies" (1987, 45). 
Thus, by claming that extensions are our autoamputated parts, he 
tears off the contact between the body and its extensions. In 
addition, he proposes that, as a counter-irritant, this 
autoamputation functions to maintain equilibrium (homeostasis) 
within a changing environment, but at the same time, produces a 
general numbness or shock that declines recognition, like Narcissus 
who is fooled with his extension. In this way, it is implied that
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even if the reference of the tools and machines is the human being, 
once they are constructed, they are not necessarily dependent on 
human; therefore not necessarily under our control.
As a matter of fact, McLuhan concludes that, as the extensions of 
the Cartesian mind, tools and machines are one-way expressions from 
centers to margins that impede human being from arriving at a 'total 
field awareness' or the ability to perceive and react the world as a 
whole, which is actually the point he is concerned with in his 
study. In this context, it is necessary to point out that the notion 
of 'autoamputation' involves the situation which Heidegger explains 
as the transformation of man into a 'standing-reserve'. As the term 
suggests, our techniques originate from, therefore, a part of 
ourselves, but now the contact is lost. The gap between man and his 
'autoamputated' extensions, in effect produce an alienation due to 
the resultant disconnection. As man disconnects from technology, he 
gets alienated from his own extensions and turns out to be a reserve 
for technology instead. If control and command can be studied on two 
levels, one being the micro level covering our individual practice, 
and the other, a macro level where the relationship of technology 
with the entire society is considered, then, especially on the 
global network man can be considered as a part of the technological 
body, or a part of "technopoly" (Postman 1993, 94). As a matter of 
fact, the recognition of this situation is what McLuhan in 
particular means by 'arriving at a total field awareness'.
McLuhan assumes both tools and machines as one-way expressions that 
separate and transgress human scale at a broad level. He points out 
a consecutive continuation between them with respect to how they
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originate, then, proposes a discrimination according to their 
capabilities for movement; but he does not differentiate tools and 
machines in terms of their utilization, further in detail. He 
problematizes the aspect of control in general, however, more 
specifically, tools and machines allow different levels of control 
and accordingly vary in terms of how they are operated. In this 
respect, Lewis Mumford's discrimination of flexible and fixed modes 
of ordering is helpful to illuminate the operative qualities of 
tools and machines:
"In general, machine emphasizes specialization of function, 
whereas the tool indicates flexibility: a planing machine 
performs only one operation, whereas a knife can be used to 
smooth wood, to carve it, to split it, or to pry open a 
lock, or to drive in a screw" (1963, 11).
For Mumford, tools and machines primarily differ in accordance to 
their degree of independence from a user. Tools lend themselves 
easily to manipulation in contrast to machines which automatically 
perform a preset action. Thus, a tool can be used in several ways by 
an operator, while a machine can perform a fixed operation itself. 
This is actually clear from the potential of the terms attained to 
these two different techniques. For instance, 'hammer' can be 
transformed into a verb as 'to hammer' which can at the same time 
signify a variety of activities like pressing, shaping, bending, 
breaking, smoothing, or even killing. On the other hand, 'blender' 
as being derived from the verb 'to blend' with a suffix, is fixed as 
a noun which denotes merely 'a device that blends' as long as its 
'on' button is pressed.
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In his inspection of the etymology of machine and tool in ancient 
Greek, Schadewalt presents the origins of these terms as "mechane' 
and 'organon' meaning respectively 'cleverly contrived means' and 
'mere instrument' that stood as opposed to each other. Especially 
after Plato, 'organon' was used in order to refer to the visible 
organs of the body, giving way to the term 'organic' that refers to 
the "natural living functional system" in contrast to the 
unconscious, purely routine qualities of the mechanical (1979, 
165). Jean Pierre Vernant similarly defines 'm^chane' in relation to 
its meanings synonymous with trick or expedient, as "an ingenious 
invention which enables a man to extricate himself from an 
embarrassing situation or aporia and assume the advantage ovbj  ^ some 
natural force that is contrary and superior to him" (1983, 286).
In this aspect, the origins of the terms justifies the view that 
machines perform fixed operations in an autonomous, but 'clever' way 
which amplifies the strength of the user, whereas tools are flexible 
in terms of their use for they depend on an operator. Still, other 
than being flexible, tools were conceptualized almost as organic 
parts, or as the extensions of the body as McLuhan would have called 
them.
This common denominator found between the terms 'flexible' and 
'extension' suggests a potentiality especially in the use of tools. 
However, the instrumental depiction of technology imposes a limit to 
this potential by delineating tools merely with one task that they 
can perform best. Naturally, machines take their share from this 
point of view as well. Carl Mitcham in his corresponding argument 
proposes that although tools can be aimed at different uses, they
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impose and insist on certain forms of operation· Therein, he makes 
the following analysis:
A carpenter's hammer is not in itself either an instrument 
for knocking out one's mother-in-law or digging weeds in 
the garden, although it could perform both functions. The 
problem is that one would fail to make sense of the claw, 
the other would fail to make sense of the mallet side of 
the head. Only when used as an instrument for fabricating 
with (driving or pulling) nails can all of its qualities be 
recognized as fitting together (1978, 235).
Tools are identified with the task they are most extensively 
employed for, however it is the user, rather than the tool which 
insists on a particular use. With their designs, -form, color, 
weight etc., tools suggest a particular relationship with the parts 
of the body. Within this relationship they can necessitate or even 
insist on certain physical actions, but they cannot determine the 
aim they are used for. As being instruments of action tools can 
inspire certain set of actions. Yet, either driving nails, or 
killing somebody, the end of the action is indifferent to a tool. 
Nevertheless, in the following course of his analysis, Mitcham's 
inquiry on primitive machines and their links to early tools 
inescapably testifies the flexibility of tools. If a simple machine 
like wedge is the development of an inclined plane, it is clear that 
inclined plane does not insist on a particular use itself. Since 
wedge is used in order to stop or cease movement, comparatively it 
employs almost a perverse use of the inclined plane which functions 
to slide, or to move large masses in general.
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If the inclined plane had been isolated with the prescribed activity 
that it was found to be performing best, the wedge could have never 
been developed. Therefore, rather than prescribed, techniques have 
inscribed functions like the inclined plane which can inspire the 
development of the wedge in spite of its prescribed function. When 
techniques are isolated with their best performed activity, other 
possible uses are concealed. Still, the isolation of a technique for 
a particular activity promises an operative simplicity as an 
advantage. Inasmuch as possible uses of a technique is fixed, other 
imprecise elements of the process like expenditure of time, skill, 
or labour are also fixed which in turn presents ease and economy in 
operations. Machines, nevertheless are a part of this attempt for 
obtaining operative optimization. Through machines, an already fixed 
quality of a tool is picked up for further isolation and 
idealization towards a level of automatic operation. In that way, 
the user is not expected to involve his skills or expend much effort 
other than starting the machine which will then perform the 
operation itself.
Although, fixed and autonomous operative qualities are attached to 
machines since their development, when it comes to computers, the 
situation is more intricate. A computer can be considered as "a 
device that computes', but computing itself is a metaphor. Rather, 
it is more appropriate to say computers compute numbers, but these 
niambers -zeros and ones, are metaphors. Thus, computers operate on 
numbers that are capable of representing metaphorically a variety of 
different tasks. Creating a simulative microcosmos, then, computers 
basically involve a fixed operation but this operation adapts to 
simulate different tasks from writing to painting, or from storing
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to transmitting. As a result^ the capability of serving for 
different tasks gives flexibility to computers^ at the same time 
turning them into something more than a machine or into a 
metamachine.
The capability of computers to integrate different functions into 
its own body puts them in an exclusive place that trusts the concept 
of automation rather than tools and machines which are transfixed 
with certain uses. As a matter of fact, while McLuhan criticises 
machines for creating isolated one-way patterns that prevent us to 
react the world as a whole, he relies upon new electronic 
technologies for the reversal of this hierarchical pattern. As he 
argues, the interlacing of all functions in a complex composed of a 
network of various centers instead of a unique center, by opening a 
space for participation of discrete parts, would in respect bring us 
much closer to total field awareness. According to McLuhan, such a 
field of interaction had already started to emerge with the rise of 
’automation'. In this context, although McLuhan confines the term 
’automation' merely to the electric age and 'cybernation', he takes 
a noteworthy step by taking attention to a vital concept that marks 
a turn in the evolution of technology. Relatively, even though tools 
and machines are antecedents of computers, automation as a general 
concept as being emancipated from prescribed specific tasks provides 
a productive path in order to approach computers.
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3.2. Automation and Control
Automation is the primary factor that distinguishes a machine from a 
tool by attaining the ability to move alone. While tools substitute 
organs^ machines substitute organs in movement. They fragment 
functions, the processing of an organ or organs, then, combine them 
in a complex as repetitive steps. In this way, a machine can be 
considered as a system made up of moving tools.
Movement, which is the discriminating factor for a machine is also 
the primary factor that characterizes automation. As André Pieyre 
de Mandiargues emphasises, "An automation is an artificial 
representation of a human being, or an animal or a natural object, 
mechanically endowed with the power of movement" (qtd. in Beaune 
1989, 474). Nevertheless, although machines and automatons have in 
common the ability to move alone, automatons are different from 
machines which are tied to an exterior energy source, hence limited 
in terms of motion. The idea of automation implies a system that is 
sufficient in itself by producing and consuming its own energy. 
Consequently, the capability of motion that characterizes an 
automaton is considered to be inexhaustible and continuous. This 
identifies automation with the idea of perpetual motion Helmholtz 
explains as follows:
Under this term [perpetual motion] was understood a 
machine, which, without being wound up, without consuming 
in the working of it falling water, wind, or any other 
natural force, should still continue in motion, the motive 
power being perpetually supplied by the machine itself. 
Beasts and human beings seemed to correspond to the idea of 
such an apparatus, for they moved themselves energetically
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and incessantly as long as they lived, and were never wound 
up; nobody set them in motion (1995, 19).
Apart from beasts and human beings, "the eternal rotation of the 
heavens", the ceaseless motion of tides, sun and the moon, rivers 
and winds that exhibit tireless continuity in nature also 
constituted the model for perpetual motion (Cardwell 1995, 57). 
Thus, starting from the early ages, automation in its attempt to 
achieve perpetual motion, basically embodied the desire to represent 
this miraculous persistence of nature with the human hand. As in his 
approach to automation, Jean-Claude Beaune discusses:
Ever since man has been capable of creating artefacts 
(which, in a sense, is the point at which he becomes fully 
human), he has dreamt of 'autonomous' machines that could 
either imitate his own actions (thus providing a more 
reliable, more dependable automatic slave substitute) or 
could reproduce the course of the world as they function 
(1989, 431).
Georges Canguilhem, by going back to the classical age where 
Aristotle referred to slave as an 'animated machine', likewise 
considers that automation is based on the assumption that it is 
possible to construct a mechanism which is miraculous in and of 
itself and does not depend on any human and animal muscle power. 
Canguilhem discusses that, according to the ancient philosophy that 
later inspired Descartes as well, "man can only make himself the 
master and proprietor of nature if he denies any natural finality or 
purpose; and he must consider the whole of nature, including all 
life forms other than himself, as solely as means to serve his
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purposes" (1993^ 52)* In that sense^ it can be envisaged that, 
automation is man's dream of a perpetium mobile by which he will 
overcome his real lack of 'infinity'. Thus, man will surmount time 
and continue to live if his ideal of an automata as his perfected 
simulacrum, is constructed one day. This view can nevertheless be 
found in Descartes' enthusiasm for automation:
Suppose that a man had been brought up all his life in some 
place where he had never seen any animals except men; and 
suppose that he was very devoted to the study of mechanics, 
and had made, or helped to make, various automatons shaped 
like a man, a horse, a dog, a bird and so on, which walked, 
and ate, and breathed, and so far as possible imitated all 
the other actions of the animals they resembled, including 
the signs we use to express our passions, like crying when 
struck and running away when subjected to a loud noise. 
Suppose that sometimes he found it impossible to tell the 
difference between the real men and those which had only 
the shape of men... (1991, 3: 99).
Fundamentally, Descartes believed that this kind of a complete 
automation could have been constructed only by God or nature. Still, 
considering nature and the natural order as excellence, from the 
early ages on man sought ways for creating an assembly that would 
perform perpetual motion like it is in nature. One of the earliest 
and most noteworthy attempts to build an automaton belongs to Heron 
of Alexandria, who had prepared a monumental piece for Dionysos in 
AD 62 (Murphy 1995). It consisted of figures moving on a wheeled 
base to a specific spot acting at the same time a scene of sacrifice 
and liberation-pouring, and then rolling back to their original
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position. The whole automation was resting upon the action created 
by descending counterweights on wheels and axles. Such early 
automations interestingly were making use of only simple machines 
which were developed from early tools. These simple machines like 
the screw^ the wedge, the wheel and axle, the lever, or the pulley 
were powered further with combinations of water, vacuum or air 
pressure in order to conduct complex movements (Giedion 1975).
In the middle ages, tide-mills, water-wheels or windmills were all 
considered to be some sort of perpetual motion machines. The common 
belief was that if "an inventor could somehow master the basic 
principles of rivers, tides, and wind he might hope to solve the 
problem completely and make a simple, self-contained perpetual 
motion machine" (Cardwell 1995, 57).
Thus, before the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century 
took place, from the end of fourteenth century to Renaissance, man 
tried to solve the principles of nature which will in turn be used 
as the construction rules of automations that will imitate nature. 
As Cardwell discusses, in the fourteenth century Europe, especially 
in Italy and Gutenberg's Germany, artist-engineers achieved the 
addition of rational control of materials to the logical control of 
the arguments of philosophers. Nevertheless, the seventeenth century 
scientific revolution gave automata its final shape by articulating 
the principles of nature and laying down the underlining rules in a 
mathematical format. In this way automation in the form of machines 
developed from the application of these rules and machines attained 
their modern definition as a man-made construction that autonomously 
produce work based on certain principles.
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In the eighteenth century, like Heron's miniature theatre which 
could have played a complete tragedy when set up, many life-like 
automations was touring Europe for aim of entertainment. Especially 
after the refinement of the clock industry, automatons were 
mechanically endowed with the capability of displaying intricate 
organic movements like walking, speaking, writing, drawing or 
playing instruments. "The flutist" which was one of the most famous 
automatons created by Jacques de Vaucanson in 1738, "was seen by all 
Paris, possessed lips that moved, a moving tongue that served as the 
air-flow valve, and movable fingers whose leather tips opened and 
closed the stops of the flute" (Giedion 1975, 35). Apart from such 
entertaining inventions, Vaucanson was also using the similar 
constructing principles to create automations for mass manufacturing 
of fabric which in spite of operation problems, significantly helped 
to raise awareness towards the benefits of using automations in 
production. Nevertheless, his mechanical loom was later to be picked 
up by Jacquard in 1804 for the invention of an automatic weaving 
machine which would be entitled thereupon with his name -the 
Jacquard loom. This type of automation employed for mass production 
were consequently not only to promote the characteristics of the 
Industrial Revolution, but also were to introduce the standard 
production method for the coming decades.
As it can be understood from the drawn schema, automation is a 
dream, a 'techno-mythological idea' in Beaune's terms, that man 
challenges forth to its realization, namely, via machines. However 
machines are not totally self-sufficient organizations like an 
automation ought to be since they are dependent on an external 
energy source. In this sense, machines recedes from automata;
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nevertheless, "Automata represents a dream, the ideal form, the
utopia of the machine, and that the gauge of their absolute
perfection is their independence" (Beaune 1989, 432). Thus, even
though every automata can at the same time be a machine; every 
machine is not only and simply an automata. As Beaune discusses,
"while each automation is a separate machine, they all, within 
themselves and their image, have the capacity to preserve the
profoundest essence of the whole technological domain" (1989, 432).
As a matter of fact, just as Beaune expresses, soon by the 
Industrial Revolution in the early nineteenth century, automation 
ceased to be a rare technological combination and became a general 
operational principle.
Industrial Revolution and mass production by taking routine and 
boring tasks from man's responsibility and performing them in higher 
speed, served to make production more effortless. But, beyond that, 
it was also the outgrowth of the endeavour to attain the perfection 
in nature through the mathematization of the human experience via 
automation. Eli Whitney who helped the Industrial Revolution to 
flourish in USA, for the similar reasons sought ways to develop 
quantitative methods and tried to eliminate the guesswork by the eye 
while he was working for the mass production of guns. As he had to 
teach every "untaught hand" in the assembly line himself, he had to 
"substitute correct and effective operations of machinery for the 
skill of the artist which is acquired only by long experience" (qtd. 
in Bell 1991, 45). To obtain correctness and efficiency,
therefore, Whitney introduced precision through standardized and 
interchangeable parts in order to replace qualitative aspects of 
production that rested upon manual work.
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The rationalization of human experience^ prevailing from the 
seventeenth century efforts to Industrial Revolution shows that, 
automation as well as involving the representation of the perpetual 
order of nature, also aimed at accomplishing control over nature. 
Driven with the affection towards the infinity of nature, automation 
was a means to challenge man's own finiteness by attempting to gain 
control over his surroundings. Relating the spontaneity of movement 
to human desire, as André Pieyre de Mandiargues argues, "The main 
sources of pleasure in watching automata is the repetition of 
movement, something that man himself lacks" (qtd. in Beaune 1989, 
474). In his rivalry with nature, man was to appropriate nature 
suitable to his needs. To perfect what nature could not bring to a 
perfection itself, nevertheless, it was again nature to provide the 
model to be used as a source of inspiration. In this conjunction, 
automation represents human beings' desire to reproduce the order of 
the nature in order to perfect our control over nature.
Accordingly, in order to obtain such an ordering similar to nature, 
everything should be as exact as the laws of nature. Nevertheless, 
the consequent mathematization that attained its maturity in the 
works of Eli Whitney, manifested precision as compulsory in order to 
reach the perfection aimed by automations or machines. However, this 
mathematical universe also required to avoid deliberately every 
qualitative aspect. As an automation has to have absolute accuracy, 
any chance of an error should be terminated. In order to gain 
complete independence and exactitude on realizing a task an 
automated machine has to perform, it was necessary to get rid of 
possible perverse effects that may be caused by the qualitative 
aspects such as the 'skill of the artisan'.
68
In this way, machines were to represent the automation archetype by 
turning into systems fixed to be complete and independent in 
themselves through eliminating every exterior interference. However, 
along with the qualitative aspects, systems' ability to take 
precautions under the disturbance of other certain exterior 
conditions was also being eliminated. In other words, due to the 
exteriorization of the guess work of the artisan, his insight and 
skill which can face and deal with incidental obstacles was also 
removed.
Striving to replace what is accidental with what is reasonable, 
automated machines delineate the efforts to get rid of 'tuch^', -the 
coincidental aspects of techne that used to be a part of the 
technological production since the beginning. In this way, machines 
are aimed to exhibit control more than nature can itself exhibit, 
yet, nature's ability to assimilate coincidence is absent. Instead 
of dealing with accidents then it is clear that instrumental view of 
technology selects to eliminate the idea of accident totally. 
Nevertheless, even if techniques are fixed to order, 'art loves 
chance and chance loves art', like the inclined plane which 
accidentally becomes a wedge, or like the wheel and axle that 
accidentally becomes a pulley.
To understand this type of accident then its is helpful to refer to 
Aristotle. In Metaphysics, he states that cause of accident (to 
sumbebekos) is neither of necessity nor always, thus the cause of 
accident is also accidental (kata sumbebekos) (VI, 2). Since the 
cause of what is accidental is indeterminate and there is no 
answering faculty for it, he proposes that there can be no
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scientific treatment of accidents. For Aristotle, 'being' has 
several meanings, of which one can be accidental. A 'white man' is 
accidentally white since whiteness is not always or for the most 
part. As the whiteness of man is accidental, man cannot be studied 
on this aspect of his being. But if we say a man is an 'animal' 
which is not accidental but always and for the most part, this 
reflects a true meaning of his 'being' and there can be a science of 
it. For Aristotle only 'what is usually' can have a scientific 
treatment, but not what is accidental or what is by chance (tuche). 
Still, he discusses that since not all things on earth is always or 
for the most part, also the accidental must exist.
In addition to the meanings of accident synonymous with what happens 
neither of necessity nor usually, Aristotle articulates another 
definition which he refers as belonging to the accidents of the 
"eternal type": "All that attaches to each thing in virtue of itself 
but not in its essence, as having its angles equal to two right 
angles attaches to the triangle" (Metaphysics, V, 30). Thus, as 
being neither of necessity nor always, whiteness accidentally 
attaches to man. As being accidental, it stands as a virtue but does 
not belong to his essence. His being an animal pertains to his 
essence, but his being white does not. Instead, what is accidental 
stands as a virtue.
Accordingly, when two right angles, that is, two 90 degrees, or 
their mathematical equivalent of 180 degrees meet, they accidentally 
attach to a triangle. Thus, 180 degrees total of angles accidentally 
make a triangle. For Aristotle, this total of angles does not belong 
to the essence of the triangle, rather they exist as a quality of a
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triangle. Saying 180 degrees total of angles accidentally make a 
triangle is nevertheless equivalent to saying accident is the thing 
which is also there inescapably, or automatically. Aristotle uses 
the term accident to signify things that exist not because of a 
plan, but that exist because they are also inscribed in the thing 
that they attach to. Thus, 180 angles is inscribed in a triangle 
inescapably, like whiteness of man is inescapably a part of him. 
Similarly, when an inclined plane accidentally makes a wedge, it 
does not exist in the essence of the wedge, because a wedge does not 
function the way an inclined plane does. But, the inclined surface 
stands as one of the qualities of a wedge.
Thus, everything apart from their essence, have accidental features. 
As well as fixed properties, they have flexible qualities which are 
nevertheless inseparable, or inescapable and also inscribed on it.
Car accidents are not different. The basic function of an automobile 
is fixed as transportation, yet speed is also inscribed in it. Paul 
Virilio questions the way cars are made to crash, as "Who would now 
dream of giving a mass-produced automobile the form of a phaeton or 
some kind of horse-drawn cart, as they did around a hundred years 
ago?" (1995, 63-64). As accident is inscribed in techne, so as
accidental functions (functions that are not fixed) are also 
inscribed in techniques. This accident is not something that does 
happens usually or of necessity; but it is also there. 'Tuche', or 
coincidence is a code built in technology. In like manner, different 
functions are codes built in different techniques. The way inscribed 
functions are revealed may be accidental, but their presence is not 
accidental in the way that we tend to understand what is accidental.
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Speed is already coded in the design of a car^ so a car accident can 
happen accidentally at a time or at a place, but the accident itself 
is not accidental» When you drive, it is just inescapable because 
its codes are already built in there.
Through emphasizing precision and control for creating autonomous 
machines, such inscribed capacities are concealed and tried to be 
get rid of. The discourse that fixes the order of things is 
reinforced further via more formal mechanisms like 'guaranty 
certificates' which are exemplary for fixing how a technique should 
be used legally. When the cooling function of a refrigerator is used 
to cool one's room temperature down, or the duplicate function of a 
computer to duplicate an item virtually in an infinite number of 
times (which simply constitutes the logic of a virus), the 
prescribed application area is trespassed. Guarantee certificates do 
not allow you to follow the latter perverse pattern, thus, rather 
than guaranteeing a technological object's endurance, certificates 
guarantee a particular use. Nevertheless, we are still living in an 
accidental universe where answering machines are used to secure your 
privacy at home, bail-point pens are used as injectors by the 
addicts in sanatoriums, or computers are used to block or steal 
information.
Machines along with the efforts to create completely autonomous 
structures, are fixed with specified functions, equipped with 
precise control and made to be complete in themselves by eliminating 
every exterior factor. However, although the idea of an automation 
requires to be complete in itself, what determines its completeness 
is not the ability to control fixed functions, but the flexibility
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in ordering that is characterized with the ability to integrate 
casual occurrences and continue perfoming whatever may happen, like 
it is in nature. Automated machines with the help of their precise 
control can perform a fixed action very well, but cannot make 
judgements themselves. While this is the case in mechanical 
automations, this lack has been recognized and challenged forth to a 
consequent restoration in the case of the computers. With these 
digital machines that are also referred as the "brain of the robot", 
the capability to make judgements is tried to be recovered on behalf 
of the machines (Wills 1995, 27).
Still, precise control is a matter of concern and even more strict 
in contemporary technology; but this time, it is maintained by the 
intelligence that is put into machines. The system that Me Donnell 
Douglas Corporation in USA employs for producing jet planes is such 
an example: "Me Donnell has equipped some of its key tools with a 
minicomputer and redundant sensors which keep track of the cutter 
path, and if the deviation reaches 0.005 in., it orders a stop. All 
this happens so quickly that the maximum error is 0.01 in." (Bell 
1991, 47). For this kind of a precision, rather than Eli Whitney's 
mechanical principles, 'algorithms' are now at work which are 
developed as a consequence of the Second Industrial Revolution, 
largely characterized by the computers that totally eliminated the 
industrial worker. By the way computers operate now, it is evident 
that another step towards the dream of creating an ideal automaton 
is taken. However, it is difficult to judge whether insisting on 
control to fix the order of things will assure to eliminate 
accidents totally, or not.
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3.3. The Digital Automata
3.3.1. Continuity between Automation and Computers
Computers, which for Neil Postman, promise the "fulfilment of 
Descartes' dreaim of mathematization of the world" have their roots 
go back to the early beginning of the nineteenth century where J. M. 
Jacquard mechanized a known technique of using punched cards to 
encode exactly repeated textile patterns (1993, 118). Nevertheless,
inspired by the Jacquard's loom, it was Charles Babbage who laid the 
foundation of computers with the aim of creating a universal 
machine. Therefore, he designed the Difference Engine in 1823, which 
was a calculation machine intended for the reproduction of 
mathematical tables, followed by the Analytical Engine in 1834 which 
was a computer in the modern sense (Cardwell 1995). "It had both a 
'store' (memory) and a 'mill' (calculating and decision unit) so 
that "numbers were swirling in and out of the mill under control of 
a program contained in the punched cards" (Beaune 1989, 460).
On the other hand, the substitution of the analogue computers by 
digital computers which subsequently spread and circumscribed every 
social domain is a development of the 20th century.
During the World War II, specifically in 1943, Alan M. Turing set 
"Colossus" or the "first truly digital computer" at work (Buchanan 
1994, 166). It was using binary arithmetic with electronic pulses
and had electronic storage. Colossus was followed by J. Presper 
Eckert's ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator) 
which was in compensation thousand times faster then the mechanical 
and electromechanical computers of the time; but a monster that 
required 100 horsepower of electrical energy and at worst enormous
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in size (Cardwell 1995)· ENIAC was followed by other models that 
attained perfection at each step like EDVAC (Electronic Discrete 
Variable Calculator) EDSAC (Electronic Delay Storage Automatic 
Computer) or ACE (Automatic Computing Engine); until they became 
manageable in size with the invention of the transistor and started 
to be manufactured for the commercial market in 1950's by which they 
subsequently entered into a faster span of development.
Seemingly, the way computers operate appears different from macliines 
as machines produce movement based on the communication of mobile 
solid parts where computers produce information based on the 
communication of electronic pulses· However, nothing could have 
illustrated computers as the continuation and a part of the utopia 
of automation than ACE, -Automatic Computing Engine, the name given 
to the computer built at the National Physical Laboratory with the 
contribution of Turing· By combining automation and engine -the 
synonym of machine, with the word 'compute' that means 'to determine 
by calculation' derived from Latin 'calculare', ACE or Automatic 
Computing Engine on the whole has a meaning equivalent to 'a machine 
that autonomously makes accurate (determined) calculations'.
Although the evolution of computers are connected to the mechanical 
machines, they are indeed the continuation of man's efforts to 
create a perfect automation. Nevertheless, machines' rigid mode of 
ordering was tried to be improved by introducing to computers 
basically the flexibility to act. Thus, as well as control, 
communication both within the parts of the machine complex and with 
the outside world was perceived as necessary. In this context.
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criticising a music box designed in the previous century^ Norbert 
Weiner states:
They [figures on top of the music box] move in accordance 
with a pattern r but it is a pattern which is set in 
advance^ and in which the past activity of the figures has 
practically nothing to do with the pattern of their future 
activity. The probability that they will diverge from this 
pattern is nil. There is a message, indeed; but it goes 
from the machinery of the music box to the figures, and 
stops there. The figures themselves have no trace of
communication with the outer world, except this one-way
stage of communication with the pre-established mechanism 
of the music box. They are blind, deaf, and dumb, and
cannot vary their activity in the least from the
conventionalized pattern (1988, 21-22).
As Norbert Wiener draws the line, the goal of the computing machines 
are not to perform routinely fixed operations, but rather, a variety 
of operations that may be asked for by a user. In that case, it has 
to communicate, i.e., be capable of understanding the messages sent 
and reply in respect of these. This suggests the controlling of a 
larger system than a mechnanical automaton which can understand, and 
process different messages, or simply which can adopt itself to 
human decision making. With such an appoinment, Wiener explains that 
"Cybernetics takes the view that the structure of the machine or of 
the organism is an index of the performance that may be expected 
from it" (1988, 57). His analogy of the machine and organism for
making decisions according to the requirements of manifold 
conditions, having the capability of using feedback mechanisms to
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previous experiences to make final judgements^ makes it visible that 
rather than the movement that produces work^ it was man's 
intelligent behavior to serve as a model for the new machines.
In his inspection of the similarities of computers and the human 
thought, James Bailey compares the models developed by Descartes and 
John Von Neuman for the organization of thought respectively for 
human beings and computers (1996). Correlative to Descartes' four 
compulsory elements for the direction of the mind, -'understanding', 
'memory', 'sense', and 'imagination', von Neuman proposes the 
following four organs a digital computer employs to organize its 
processing: (a) the memory, which is used to store numerical data 
for calculations and instructions, (b) the arithmetic organ, which 
is used to carry out usual arithmetic operations, (c) the logical 
control, which can understand the sent messages and perform them 
accordingly, and (d) the input-output organ, which provides 
interface for communicating with the outside world (1996, 63).
Although in this scheme, we cannot find the exact correlative of one 
of the indispensable motors of the human mind, -imagination, this 
much proves computers to be capable of exhibiting intelligence. They 
can receive, store, process information and transmit their 
judgements to solve given problems. Sustained by feedback 
mechnanisms, they can learn to perform new operations or refer to 
previous judgements for making new ones.
As a result, unlike machines which are devoted to simulate man's 
capability of movement, computers -as implied with the notion of 
calculation embodied in their meaning-, are to simulate the 
intelligence or "crucial human capacity of rational thinking"
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(Bolter 1993,- 13). Computers which are frequently referred to as 
-intelligent machines', for Maurozio Morgantini, therefore, are the 
prostheses of the mind, following the prostheses of limbs and senses 
(1989). For David Bolter, here lies the essence of Alan Turing's 
belief in artificial intelligence: "By making a machine think as a 
man, man creates himself, defines himself as a machine" (1993, 13). 
This situation shows us that Descartes' conception of man as a 
machine, which he expressed in his Treatise on Man (1662) was still 
prevalent at least in the early 20th centuryt
I suppose the body to be nothing but a statue or machine 
made of earth...(1985, li 99).
By the 1950’s with a slight deviation in content, man was conceived 
as an 'information processor' rather than a machine which was 
manifested by Herbert Simon:
Man is born an information processor with an empty memory 
store, and he programs himself to become an adult solver" 
(qtd. in Bolter 1992, 152).
Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, with whom the use of computers to 
simulate intelligence have taken its start, have claimed that 
computers could make more than mere calculations. For this reason, 
their aim was to demonstrate that the data stored in computers could 
be made to stand for anything as well as representing the 
characteristics of the real world, and that its programs could be 
employed as rules for relating these features. "The structure of an 
expression in the computer, then, could represent a state of affairs 
in the world whose features had the same structure, and the computer 
could serve as a physical symbol system storing and manipulating
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such representations" (Dreyfuss 1994, x). Nevertheless, in this 
way, Newell and Simon were successful in proving that computers can 
simulate important aspects of intelligence.
The programs used as rules which Newell and Simon discuss are 
actually the feature that makes computers appear as exhibiting
intelligence for they give computers their decision making ability. 
Computers operate based on these decision rules named ^algorithms' 
that are coded and stored in their memory. As Bell discusses, just
like Eli Whitney who substituted artisans’ skill with machines,
algorithms substitute human judgement for obtaining efficiency in 
accuracy and speed. These decision rules provide basic operative 
rules according to a fixed logic, but depending on the given 
commands they decide on what route to take among the prescribed
routes, so that, in a way, they act flexibly. The operations which 
are not coded as algorithms cannot be exhibited, but the computer 
still has the flexibility circumscribed by the flexibility of the 
algorithms. Moreover, algorithms may be encouraged further to learn. 
As seen in Case-Based Systems, computers can transform the results 
of a completed task and store it in their memory as another 
algorithm which will be involved in operations for the next time. As 
a matter of fact, this is the aspect where the intelligence of 
computers are polished to the extent that they arouse enthusiasm as 
an achievement in man's challenge for fastening the ideals of 
automata in many people like Charles Susskind:
Thus, a computer can evidently learn, it can respond to new 
situations, it can solve problems, it can direct other 
machines and even people, it can answer questions. But it 
can only do so in ways foreseen by the human programmer
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-though it is true that it can do it vastly faster^ 
performing complex computations in a few hours that it 
would take a human several lifetimes to compute (1973, 
54) .
In search for the simulation of human intelligence, computers are 
today sophisticated to a degree where they compete with man as in 
the case of Deep Blue which played chess with Garry Kasparov and 
amazed him to a large degree by winning in their first match: "But a 
computer, I thought, would never make such a move. A computer can’t 
'see* the long-term consequences of structural changes in the 
position or understand how changes in pawn formations may be good or 
bad" (1996, 43).
Such an exhibition of high intellect may be surprising, however as 
Newell and Simon have already suggested, computers can simulate not 
only human intelligence but the entire life itself as long as it is 
translated into algorithms. That is, as long as it is programmed, 
the computer can virtually perform anything. Because of this 
quality, Weizenbaum specifies computers as -abstract machines' which 
in spite of their physical embodiment, can even violate the laws of 
physics, like designing a machine which has internal signals faster 
than the speed of light (1976). As being bound to physical laws, 
although computer itself cannot operate faster than light, it can 
simulate a machine which can. For Weizenbaum, "A computer running 
under control of a stored program is thus detached from the real 
world in the same way that every abstract game is" (1976, 112).
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The abstraction in computers which attains them the flexibility to 
perform any operation^ nevertheless stands as an interrupting 
prerequisite for users who are to operate them. Like a game whose 
rules you have to learn before you can play, before you start to use 
a computer you have to be aware of its perfectly abstract order. 
Since "a computer is a superb symbol manipulator", to deal with 
them, its symbolic order has to be inhabited (Weizenbaum 1976, 
98). Therefore, although computers continue the idea of automation 
by conceptually promising to perfoim any work, they have a cost; and 
rather than the challenge necessary to communicate with them, this 
cost can be a disconnection between man and machine waiting at the 
break point of such a challenging encounter.
3.3.2. Discontinuity between Man and Machine
The present improvements in digital technology and artificial 
intelligence studies can provide one with the insight that human 
being has arrived to a degree which Descartes mentioned as the time 
where it will be impossible to tell the difference between the real 
men and the one which had only the form of men. In that sense, it 
would not be difficult to believe automation has reached its 
objective. However, this time men is confronted with a problem of 
relinquishing control over his environment which was supposed to be 
in his hands since the time technology came into our view.
"The computer is a playing field on which one may play out any game 
one can imagine" states Weizenbaum (1976, 112). Thus, although
computers are promising to simulate all the capacities of human mind 
and perform any work, the range of their performance is nevertheless
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confined to human imagination. For this reason, this faculty of 
human thought does not have a direct correlative in computer's 
organization of thought as it can be seen in the comparison of 
Descartes' and von Neuman's models. Additionaly, Hurbert L. Dreyfuss 
insists that computers can never totally simulate intelligence; 
because "it is a hopeless task" for Artificial Intelligence research 
to articulate and convey know-how or our "everyday commonsense 
background understanding that allows us to experience what is 
currently relevant as we deal with things and people" (1994, ix) . 
Still, knowing that computers are not endowed with the human 
capabilities of either imagination or insight does not resolve our 
problems in conducting them.
Even though this view makes the claim that computers are far from 
reaching its utopia; today, computers are intelligent enough to 
confuse people. Operating a computer is not yet an easy task as 
using a hammer or rotating a bicycle wheel as it requires the 
ability to decode the codes built in it. Communicating with the 
computer, at the first moment of its start requires the user the 
ability to speak computer's own language; therefore, it is 
impossible to deal with a computer in daily language. Even if, the 
computer is 'user friedly', that is, provided with an interface that 
operates in our language, the commands themselves are metaphors that 
signify certain operations for the computer, like 'open',
'compress', 'trace' etc. Everyday computers lack contextual
understanding, so, each particular action is conducted by a single 
particular command. For example, if one means to 'open' the 
computer, he cannot use the term 'open', but has to use the term 
'start' instead. Similarly, if one wants to 'start' a program, he
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cannot use the term 'start'. In order to get a response, this time 
he will have to give the computer the order to 'open'. Like 'start' 
and 'open', the coitunands 'copy' and 'duplicate' also seem to 
correspond eachother, but initiate different routines. When the 
'copy' command is given, the computer thinks that it is ordered to 
keep the selected item in its memory; when its asked to 'duplicate', 
it directly pastes a copy of the selected item next to it. If the 
aim was to make a selected item double, after the 'copy' command 
there will be no visible change unless the computer is ordered to 
'paste', by which, it will then place the copied item in the middle 
of the selected area. Thus, as these simple examples suggest, even 
if one knows the terms the computer will understand and respond to, 
he has to know what type of actions these commands will initiate 
exactly. Therefore, the problem of communicating with the computer 
is not only due to the problem of language, but due to its entire 
systematics employed for thinking which is nevertheless represented 
by the language. Computers involve a specific and different mode of 
thinking shaped by the rules embodied in algorithms, and like its 
language, one has to be familiar with such mode of thinking in order 
to operate them.
Nevertheless, in order to explore computers' mode of ordering, one 
has to face a considerable challenge. Simply, due to the knowledge 
gap of the users concerning these algorithms, computers appear as if 
they are the ones making decisions instead of people. Instead of 
realizing the orders given in accordance to a plan, computers seem 
to present a series of 'accidents.' In every command, computer 
performs what it strictly understands and uses the capacities of the 
rules inscribed as algorithms. Thus, an 'accident for the user' is
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never an 'accident for a computer", but the result of a determined 
operation· Although such accidents are not actually accidents but 
are tied to the codes built in the computer, users, nevertheless, do 
not have access to such codes. Especially in graphic design, 
designers frequently have to stay content with such accidental or 
default solututions. Thus, if not the minority called *programmers’, 
most of the people or 'users' seem to slip the control of this 
'technology of command and control', that is, computers as Norbert 
Wiener refers to them. We seem to arrive at a condition where man, 
facing the dominance of technology with which he was supposed to 
gain dominance himself, is pushed to a dramatic situation 
illustrated at best with Garry Kasparov who in an interview before 
his duel with Deep Blue stated that his aim was to "help defend our 
dignity” (Wright 1996, 38).
For Wright, in this manner Kasparov was personifying "some kind of 
identity crisis that computers have induced in our species" (1996, 
38). In his argument concerning the pressure contemporary technology 
exerts upon people, Scott Bukatman refers to Bruce Mazlish who 
evaluates this critical situation as another ego-smashing moment for 
humanity. With homage to Freud, Mazlish explains that there are 
"three 'ego-smashing' historical moments for humanity: the
Copernican revolution, which displaced the earth from its central 
position in the universe; Darwin's theories, which "robbed man of 
his peculiar privilege of having been specifically created, and 
relegated him to a descent from the animal world"; and Freud's own 
contribution, which demonstrated that the subject "is not even 
master in his own house," but is subject to the unknown operations 
of the unconscious" (1993, 8). In this context, Mazlish suggests
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that the fourth one ±8 threatening human kind due to the 
discontinuity between men and machine in our times.
By discontinuity of man and machine, Mazlish no doubt also considers 
man’s problem of communicating with the digital technology that is 
manifested in the form of our loss of control. Nevertheless, his 
statement actually involves the demolition of the belief in 
Cartesian equation of man and machine. It implies that, to the 
extent man chases the ideals embedded in automata in the light of 
the absoluteness of reason and challenges forth for a medium of 
perfection that would serve him; he recognizes how distant this 
dream actually is.
It is in this context, then, Lyotard evaluates the gap between the 
scientific discourse and the scientific progress; man's utopian 
ambitions and its resultant development, as responsible for creating 
the setting for the postmodern condition. Thus, he defines 
postmodern as the "incredulity toward metanarratives" that is 
presupposed by the progress in science (1984, xxiv). Different from 
the modern that legitimates itself with reference to a 
metadiscourse, for Lyotard, in the postmodern condition we are 
confronted with a problem of legitimation due to the exteriorization 
of knowledge from the 'knower'. As he argues, it is the advent of 
digital technology or specifically the advent of "information­
processing machines" which form the new constraints of the status of 
knowledge:
The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within 
this context of general transformations. It can fit the new 
channels, and become operational, only if learning is
85
translated into quantities of information* We can predict 
that anything in the constituted body of knowledge that is 
not translatable in this way will be abandoned and that the 
direction of new research will be dictated by the 
possibility of its eventual results being translatable into 
computer language. The "producers” and users of knowledge 
must now, and will have to, possess the means of 
translating into these languages whatever they want to 
invent or learn. Research on translating machines is 
already well advanced. Along with the hegemony of computers 
comes a certain logic, and therefore a certain set of 
prescriptions determining which statements are accepted as 
"knowledge" statements (1984, 4).
Consequently, in a condition where knowledge is coded, preserved and 
processed as algorithms, Lyotard, with a justifiable distress 
proposes that computers will determine the authorities from now on; 
because "functions of regulation, and therefore of reproduction, are 
being and will be further withdrawn from administrators and 
entrusted to machines” (1984, 14). With this determination then, he 
unfolds the problem awaiting us:
...the central question is becoming who will have access to 
the information these machines must have in storage to 
guarantee that the right decisions are made (1984, 14).
In the absence of 'the old poles of attraction', the answer to 
Lyotard's question can today be answered as 'technological experts'. 
The notion of 'technological expertise' has negative connotations 
for it has connections to Technocracy, a formation which is
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frequently criticised for being transformed into a Technopoly. 
However, for Scott Bukatman, in the notion of 'technological 
expertness' lies the chance for us to release the fourth ego- 
smashing discontinuity. He explains the issue with the concept 
-"technological mode of being in the world", by referring to Walter 
McDougall who on traditional science fiction states: "Americans 
delight in such futuristic epics as Star Trek and Star Wars is 
precisely because the human qualities of a Captain Kirk or Han Solo 
are always victorious over the very technological mega-systems that 
make their adventure possible. We want to believe that we can 
subsume our individualism into the rationality of systems yet retain 
our humanity still" (1993, 8). Bukatman, by focusing on such 
technological experts, and in relation, on the interface of 
technology and human exhibited in such narratives, declares the end 
of the subject, and in turn, the emergence of a new subjectivity 
constructed at the computer station or television screen. For 
Bukatman, this new subjectivity or "Terminal Identity" that is 
already being employed in contemporary science fiction comprises the 
master-narrative that underlines the postmodern culture.
3.3.3. Computer Consciousness and the New Subject
At this instant, it is difficult to decide whether the notion of 
'technological mode of being in the world' can stand as master- 
narrative of the postmodern culture, or more strictly, whether if 
there is a master-narrative underlining the postmodern culture at 
all. However, as a way of challenging today's technological 
circumference and opening an individual space within, developing a 
technological mode of being in the world seems to be a prerequisite.
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The knowledge crisis which Lyotard takes attention tOr also seems to 
be responsible for the consequent alienation regarding our 
relationship with the present technological circumference· Thus, 
although Norbert Wiener says computers are to communicate, it is 
clear that we have problems in communicating with them· An 
intelligent technology circumvents us, which is able to receive 
orders, and ready to perform; however in order to be able to 
communicate with it, we are confronted with a prerequisite barrier 
of acquiring 'expert knowledge'· If such an expert knowledge is the 
knowledge necessary to operate specifically computers or softwares, 
then how can it be thoroughly attained in a condition where new 
technologies are released before you decipher the previous one· No 
doubt, one's background makes transformation to new systems less 
difficult, but new systems, or softwares never cease to advance in 
multiple forms of new variations· Therefore, it is impossible to 
propose that the existing problems will be solved when expert 
knowledge is gained· There will always be a particular lack of 
knowledge that will hinder arrival at the level of sheer 
'expertness'· Technology always has to hold the promise of something 
more, and the discontinuity between man and technology is actually 
the driving force of technology in general·
However, instead of maintaining this particular knowledge about the 
essence of technology, the instrumental view prefers to secure the 
knowledge of the present techniques in an effort to control and 
conduct technology· In a climate where we suffer from a lack of 
communication due to the lack of knowledge, the popular science 
fiction characters to which Bukatman refers, appear equipped with 
the knowledge to communicate with their technologies· On the other
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hand, although, they can represent the victory of human values over 
large technological systems, such values also embrace the depiction 
of technology as a mere instrument necessary to control the course 
of things, transfixed in the will to master it· Nevertheless, as if 
to represent such an instriunental mode of ordering, the technology 
employed in such traditional science fiction narratives are strictly 
mere accessories· Thus, for example, if someone exchanges the 
spaceships of Star Trek with the Star Wars, without an apparent 
modification in their plots, their crews can still continue their 
voyage.
In this context, the works of classical Science Fiction literature 
where the protagonists are involved in 'making' or creating, like 
Mary Shelley's Dr· Frankenstein, are not different in illustrating 
the instrumental point of view· Similarly, within this view, 
technology is always positioned as a tool that man must explore and 
control in order to tame nature (universe) and put it at the service 
of humanity (world)· Otherwise, if communicating with technology is 
not sustained, the control is lost, and it gives way to catastrophic 
accidents· In such narratives, technology is always visualized as a 
bridge towards a definite goal, whether the goals are achieved at 
the end or not· It has no necessary consequence on the construction 
of the characters or the becoming of the events· It is just a means 
for an end· Thus, similarly if you change the mass of wire and steel 
in Dr· Frenkenstein’s laboratory with that of H· G· Well's Time 
Traveller, he will still time travel, and the other will still give 
birth to a son of his own name. In these literary works of classical 
Science Fiction, the type of technology employed is not specified.
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and its possible qualities has no peculiar importance or consequence 
on either the qualities of events or the characters.
In such narratives which utilize the instrumental view of 
technology, although the use of technology is not as consequential, 
it nevertheless always exists. As an authority, it provides power 
and credibility for the ones who are in touch with it. People hold, 
wear, attach technology to their bodies; but still, it is something 
exterior, 'other' to the organic body. So that, for instance, any 
technologically equipped body never continue to see like a human; 
their vision turns into a technological interface, jammed with a 
flow of technical data receiving and transmitting information. 
Generally giving information that is already visible to the naked 
eye, technology acts like Alberti's Window, representing seventeenth 
century way of seeing, which can be achieved by a pair of (not 
necessarily high-tech) binoculars. From Terminator to Robocop, or 
Aliens to Star Wars, in the entire 'culture of prosthesis', 
technology is used as an accessory in order to support the allure of 
the protagonist and to create the futuristic ambience which h/she 
inhabits; but if these accessories are stripped away, the most 
ancient of all plots, -the battle of good and bad, is laid bare. As 
a matter of fact, Darko Suvin when categorizing Science Fiction as 
'extrapolative' and 'analogical' makes the distinction among such 
narratives as the ones which trace the already existing systems, and 
respectively, the ones that envisage tomorrow by making a criticism 
of the present (1979). But he barely says that the ones that trace 
the existing systems also trace the seventeenth century reminiscent 
view of technology which is strictly instrumental.
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In contrast to the instrumental view of technology as practised in 
traditional Science Fiction narratives, we are confronted with 
another perspective which is manifested especially in Cyberpunk 
literature. Because of its watchful and critical attributes towards 
the instrxunental use of technology, therein, it will not be 
inadequate to refer this approach as practising an 'existential view 
of technology'. Due to theii' credence and dependence on technology, 
these narratives are capable of illustrating a model for 
'technological mode of being' more suitably. Thus, dealing with 
subjects who are created rather than creating with technology. 
Cyberpunk narratives share a common attitude by making their 
protagonists visible via specific technologies. Obsessed with 
exploring unbeaten paths, such narratives, instead of accelerating 
towards a specific aim and conclusion, generally with undetermined 
goals, do not even attempt to conclude and stay content by unfolding 
an existing situation which virtually continues. Within this scheme, 
technology in concern, not only gives start and direction to the 
evolution of events, but essentially becomes responsible for the 
structure and the psychology of the characters. For instance, Bruce 
Sterling's last novel. Holy Fire is about a recovered bureaucrat who 
after the treatment partially loses her memory and hitchhikes to 
Europe with a new born but a disordered body and a traumatic mind 
(1996). In her short story. Speech Sounds, Octavio Butler deals with 
a post-war generation whose language ability is completely damaged 
due to a virus, consequently giving way to a new social order 
(1996). In another short story. Even the Queen, Connie Willis, 
narrates the humorous dilemma of a future generation of women who 
are able to avoid menstruation by wearing shunts that pump ammenerol 
to their body (1994). Finally, one of the cult examples of the
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field, William Gibson's Neuromancer, is concerned with a 
dispossessed subject whose only drive and expertise is cyberspace 
(1984).
What all these unconventional narratives imply is that, within the 
circumstances of the era we are confronted with subjects who are 
brought about, affected, oriented, or simply, created by technology. 
These subjects are all consequents of technology and cannot continue 
to exist if technology does not exist. Actually, they would not 
commence to exist if their technology was not existing. They tell 
the stories of Frankenstein the Son; who, refusing the Father, 
connects to the Machine. For this reason, I consider this point of 
view as 'existential', implying a 'reversal of connection' in man- 
technology relationship, drawing the outlines of a new subject who 
rather fixing technology as an attachment to conduct things, does 
not differentiate technology but conducts the course of events 
including his or her own 'making' as connected to it. This 
existential view of technology, essentially, depicts technology not 
as barely a tool but as a flawless machine, an organisation with its 
own cosmos.
Deteriorating the term 'cyborg' from conventional science fiction 
narratives, Donna Haraway claims that being a cyborg has got nothing 
to do with prosthetic attachments, but is in the way that we 
manufacture our own bodies (1997). She exemplifies the case with 
'shoes' which were once produced without discriminating the left or 
the right foot, but today are produced in various qualities suitable 
to every particular activity. Therein, Haraway suggests that 
"Winning in the Olympics in the cyborg era isn't just about running
92
fast. It's about the interaction of medicine^ diet^ training 
practices, clothing and equipment manufacture, visualization and 
timekeeping." (1997, 157). In this way, without naming them, 
Haraway also clashes the instrumental and existential views of 
technology, saying that rather than being a separate and indifferent 
accessory, with all of its possible qualities technology is embedded 
and determining the way that we live.
As being related with how we manage to organize a living, the term 
'technological mode of being' suggests an awareness towards our 
technological circumference. Communication does not consist of a 
one-way entry, but the instrumental view of technology insists on 
exteriorizing and fixing the qualities of technology, emphasizing 
only control whose opposite is manifested as accident. Although, 
this view simplifies and makes things easier to handle, it is far 
from grasping the essence of technology. To hold on with the present 
technological circumference, one has to adjust connections in ways 
that penetrate into machines' mode of ordering. For this reason, 
among various past and future scenarios surrounding technology, from 
H. G. Well's time-travelling scientist to William Gibson's 
neuromancing cybernaut, the present 'technological mode of being' is 
best to be explored within the addictive electro-landscape of the 
latter. These two cult science fiction protagonists with their 
common virtuoso in operating sophisticated technologies, yet 
different conceptions about the notion of technology, help to 
evaluate the tool-machine debate from a different perspective.
In this context, in order to proceed in this perspective, it becomes 
necessary to refer tool and machine not as technological objects,
93
but rather as concepts· To do so^ it is helpful to follow Deleuze 
and Guttari's discussion on tool and machine. In their model, they 
do not discriminate tools and machines for their physical attributes 
but according to whether they are conceptualized within a 
"projective system" or not (1973, 118). For them, the hypothesis of 
projection depicts tools as the extension and the projection of 
human beings, through which human beings progress along with the 
tool itself, arriving at machines which are developed to be more 
independent of man. Since this projective scheme ties tools and 
machines in a continuous evolution and evaluates them as extensions, 
there is no necessary difference between them, thus, "one and a same 
thing can be a tool or a machine" (1973, 119).
On the other hand, they conceptualize the idea of machine like a 
pattern consisting of recurrence and communication, forming a break- 
flow system where everything acts as cuts in a continuous flux and 
connects to each other. The codes built into every machine seeks for 
a flow to cut, a place and a means to interrupt and connect. In 
every machine not only the break-flow relations of its parts but 
probable other break-flow connections with other machines are also 
recorded. Out of these breaks-flows "desire wells up, thereby 
constituting its productivity and continually grafting the process 
of production onto the product" (1983, 17). Just as separate parts 
like gears, clasps, disks, or propellers that are a cut which are 
then connected in a flow to make up a machine, machines connect to 
make up other machines. Factory itself is another machine that is 
connected to other desiring-machines. Dancer with the floor, man-bow 
with a horse, the worker with a tool are also ensembles that can
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make other machines. In this respect, Deleuze and Guattari explain 
the difference between the tool and the machine as:
...the one as an agent of contact, the other as a factor of 
communication; the one being projective, the other 
recurrent; the one referring to the possible and the 
impossible, the other to the probability of a less 
probable; the one acting through functional synthesis of 
the whole, the other through real distinctions in an 
ensemble. Functioning as a component part in conjunction 
with other parts is very different from being an extension 
or a projection, or being replaced (an instance where there 
is no communication)" (1973, 118-119).
Accordingly, with their definition of machine Deleuze and Guattari 
arrive at an 'introjective' model which consists "a certain perverse 
use of the machine" as opposed to the projective model (1973, 119).
Introjection, or the perverse use of the machine, thus, encompasses 
the adaptation of the externals into the self, in a way to have a 
sense of oneness with them. In the introjective use of machine a 
consequential influence oscillates, so that each component is 
affected by what happens to the other. Adaptation of the externals 
into the self and getting affected by the consequences of this 
communication nevertheless do not involve the model that of a 'man 
as a machine' nor 'machine as a man'; what arises out of this 
reversal of the projective system is rather a new subject: 'a man- 
machine assemblage':
"The object is no longer to compare man and the machine in 
order to evaluate the correspondences, the extensions, the 
possible or impossible substitutions of one for the other, 
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but to bring them into communication in order to show how 
man is a component part of the machine, or combines with 
something else to constitute a machine" (1973, 117).
The reversal of the projective model, also inspires for another set 
of ideas governing the relationship of man with the tool and man 
with the machine. Delivering from the above stressed points, I 
consider that in both assemblages, there exists a connection; 
however its directions are reversed. In the relationship of man with 
the tool, it is the tool which connects to the body and the reach of 
the body determines the reach of the tool. Conversely, in man’s 
relationship with the machine, it is the man who connects to the 
machine, and the reach distance is determined by the machine this 
time.
As a matter of fact, it may be considered that, since there is a 
connection and communication in both situations, a variance is not 
necessary; but the 'direction of the connection' governs the
conflicts in relating man to technology. More essentially by
determining what is a tool and what is a machine, it helps to
construct new definitions and strategies for dealing with them. 
Therefore, as of special concern here, in the relationship of man 
with the machine, it is the man who connects to the machine, forming 
a kind of assemblage with it. Although, the determinant seems to be 
manifested as the machine, this shall not be conceived as a defeat 
in a battle of hierarchy or a dystopic enslavement routine. In my 
consideration, this inspires a strategy which requires connecting to 
the machine in order to be able to synchronise with it, inhabit its 
reach capacity and achieve a 'continuity' with it. Otherwise
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machines would be confined to our own capabilities which would 
simply lead to ignore the capacity of them as it is already 
practised within the projective system. To make use of machines, one 
has to connect it, explore its capabilities through which s/he would 
spontaneously inhabit new reach distances, a broader range for 
him/herself.
On another hand, it may appear that, the above stressed ideas on the 
'direction of connection' resonates with Deleuze and Guattari's 
notion of 'introjection' in a rather paradoxical way. However, 
introjection, can be read both as 'the adaptation of the externals 
into the self', or 'adaptation of the self to the externals' as long 
as a sense of oneness is obtained with them. Thus, it does not 
necessarily indicate a particular direction of connection between 
the subject and the externals which is substantive for the act of 
adaptation. With the 'perverse use of the machine and tool', Deleuze 
and Guattari try to distil an awareness against the instrumental 
view and practice of technology. On the roiite that surpasses the 
instrumental bounds, connection is introjection's prerequisite. 
Without connecting one cannot adapt the externals into the self, 
thus, cannot obtain a sense of wholeness, and technological mode of 
being awaits behind the intention of this reverse pattern.
As a result, as popular representations of technology also 
represent, the notions of tool and machine are not totally related 
with the physical devices themselves, but with how they are 
perceived and used. Thus, from this perspective, computers can 
either be tools or machines depending on their users' view of 
technology. Similarly, it seems, a tool can also be conceived like a
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machine and that is how Van Gogh might have used his brush. Using 
computers as a tool, through restraining them with the memory of the 
existing tools, suggests nothing more than what the existing tools 
are capable of doing and establishes a distance to the faculties of 
the machine. Yet, the notion of machine involves, thus, necessitates 
’a perverse connection*, penetration and respective synchronization 
with it.
In his study, David Wills tells the story of African women who carry 
water with pans on their heads for a couple of hours everyday 
without needing to balance the pan on their head, "as if attached 
like Bobby's biosoft slab" (1995, 81). Wills refers this as a 
prosthetic mode that both African women or computer engineers in 
their laboratories slide into. Although the term 'prosthetic mode' 
suggests a tendency towards the instrumental scheme. Wills explains 
it recalling the 'system of break-flow' as a condition where "there 
is no structural distinction between the mechanics of the switching 
and the fluidity of immersion" (85). Yet, he evaluates the mechanics 
of switching not as an easy phase to pass, but essentially the only 
means to arrive at a fluidity. Therein, he refers to William 
Gibson's Neuromancer, for the difference between 'simstim' and 
'jacking in'.
In Neuromancer, 'simstim' and 'jacking in' are both ways to connect 
that the protagonist (Case) switches back and forth in order to 
break through the opponent system in the matrix; but simstim is a 
kind of private cinema where he attaches to another just like a 
passenger behind someone's (Molly) eyes. In that way, Molly does the 
physical work in the actual world and provides information to Case
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who is connected and shares her vision. When Case switches back to 
the Matrix, he 'jacks in', that is, connects to the Matrix, 
producing the cyberspace himself as he experiences it (1984).
In all his switches back and forth. Case despises 'simstim', for he 
can involve and conduct things himself when he 'jacks in'; 
nevertheless to complete a task he needs the knowledge that is 
provided by simstim, as well. Likewise, in the present problems with 
technology, the lack of practical knowledge evidently presents a 
problem which is necessary to be overcome if the technological mode 
of being is to attained. This makes switching and connecting to a 
machine more complex and troublesome. Still, rather than employing 
technology based on a one-way, fixed pattern, it is more productive 
to seeks ways to establish a communication through connection. Over 
and above. Case has no expert knowledge of computers except how to 
ride them; in the assemblage he enters with his Head Mounted 
Display, custom made deck and the Matrix, he only knows he has to 
connect, or to 'jack in'. This gives him, the vision and circulation 
capability of a virus that connects to a body and adapts to the body 
as well as adapting the qualities of the body for itself.
That's why, hackers are a good example to illustrate the 
'technological mode of being', who have no knowledge of the entire 
system but know how to communicate and where to connect. As being 
acquainted with the codes built into the system, they cut and 
connect in all potential ports, drifting the machine away from its 
prescribed, fixed functions. Their technology is far from being 
instrumental, it the very way that they exist. By knowing that a 
great amount of hackers belong to Iron Curtain countries, one
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wonders what can be their purpose except to show that they 'exist' 
(Sterling 1994). Thus^ if 'the existential use of technology' still 
does not suggest anything, it may at least help to answer this 
question.
The awareness of the technological circumference and developing an 
identity within the realm of this awareness promises to release the 
alienation people are subjected to. 'Hackers' on the Net, conscious 
about the suppressing circuit of technology, demonstrate this view 
on the extreme with their identities constructed in front of a 
terminal that challenge and survive in the technological arena.
In graphic design it is again this notion that discriminates the 
contemporary efforts that challenge the digital space, explore and 
inhabit its logic. The way contemporary designers use and 
communicate with the digital medium already signal a technological 
mode of being in the world with its consciousness about the way 
computers operate. Thus, on the way to inspect the consequences of 
the new digital medium on graphic design, such an awareness of the 
machine can help to construct the profile of today's digital 
designer who is no more a designer in traditional terms nor a 
computer engineer, but a new subject who emerges as the two fields 
crash, emancipated from their laws and regulations.
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4. THE DIGITAL DESIGN PROCESS
New the choices are limitless: creating 
many images from one, enchanting, 
retouching, adding and subtracting color, 
combining different photos into one. 
E-mailing everything across the Internet 
and putting it all on a Fifeb page.
Yes, you can advertise, pictorialize, 
verbalize, specialize and economize...
All with The Art and Science of Imaging.
Olympus Digital Vision 
Wired Magazine Advertisement.
4.1. Graphic Design as a Discipline of Visual Communication
with the introduction of computers in the second half of the 1980's^  
graphic design discipline has taken its share from the debate 
created by digital technology. On one side, computers took time­
taking and routine tasks like rápido works, masking, or typesetting 
from designers' responsibility. On the other side, the use of 
computers spread so rapidly that almost without having a chance to 
read the software manuals, designers started to produce images by 
using this new medium which with its own logic and structure, 
exteriorized their control over the design process to a considerable 
degree. Computers, as well as facilitating the design process, 
paradoxically, gave it a complicated constitution by introducing 
high speed, providing almost an unlimited range of options and 
insisting on the decisions their algorithms make. As a result, just 
as it occurred on the general realm, with the introduction of 
'intelligent automations' or the digital technology, designers also
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encountered a considerable alienation through which they fell into 
the suspicion of losing the control of their work medium; hence 
losing the control of their own designs· As designer John Spatchurst 
warns:
"New technology is very powerful· It is easy to be seduced 
by its versatility and seemingly endless choice· But, while 
acknowledging its potential, we must step back and impose 
our own will, rather than be led blindly by technology" 
(1993, 131).
The controversial consequences that the digital technology exerts 
upon graphic design can be understood by underlining the fact that 
design, -like technology- is mostly identified with planning and 
ordering in its general sense, the way Richard Buchanan does:
Design is a thought or plan -that organizes all levels of 
production, whether in graphic design, engineering and 
industrial design, architecture, or the largest integrated 
systems found in urban planning (qtd. in Margolin 1993, 
3).
Design, as being almost synonymous with 'to plan', like technology, 
consists of initiating required changes in the circumstances 
according to predetermined objectives. Philip Thiel, even referring 
design as a "purposeful planning", defines it as "the devising of 
courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into 
preferred ones" (1981, 31). As a discipline that has always existed 
together with technology, it was, nevertheless, inescapable for 
design to rely its intentions on the notion of control and order 
which formed the common understanding of technology. For this
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reason, the motivation that gave birth to technology, propelled 
design and in a way introduced it to the constraints that define 
technology:
Design is the means by which we order our surroundings, re­
shaping natural materials to suit our needs and purposes. 
It arises at the interface between human-kind and raw 
environment and expresses human intentions, desires and 
hopes (Rawson 1988, 10).
Specifically, in correspondence to the above definition, graphic 
design is developed as a discipline of communication by using visual 
means. In this context, graphic designers' objective was to 
communicate information as efficiently as possible. For this reason, 
they sought ways to optimize the visual language and tried to 
articulate basic rules for the arrangement of the design elements on 
the two dimensional surface. Thus, especially from the early 
twentieth century onwards, in order to succeed in its primary 
concern and justification of existence, graphic design followed a 
route that aimed at highly redundant designs, as simple, clear and 
ordered as possible. Such a concern that constructs the modernist 
understanding in graphic design is formulated best in the efforts of 
New Objectivity or the so-called International Style, which "in 
their search for the objective presentation of information, aimed to 
develop rational principles to determine the organizations of type, 
rules, white space and colors" (Livingston 1992, 145) (fig. 4.).
The visual language modified on this view was also reinforced by the 
modern avant-garde movements in art, or more basically by the
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prescriptions of modernist visuality which for Rosalind Krauss 
"wants nothing more than to be the display of reason, of the 
rationalized, the coded, the abstracted, the law" (1993, 23).
Nevertheless, the refined visual language of graphic design started 
to erode by 1960's and by the 1980's completely left its place to a 
chaotic expression which subsequently formed today's popular imagery 
in graphic design (fig. 5.).
The rise of such chaotic imagery as well as inciting enthusiasm by 
announcing new orientations in design, is most frequently faced with 
sharp criticisms and condemned for ruining the communicative 
qualities of graphic design. In one of such critiques entitled "Cult 
of the Ugly", Steven Heller argues that contemporary designs have 
demolished the grid, preferred confusion to simplicity, 
fragmentation to continuity, hipper to less and decorative noise to 
tidiness, therefore, they have created a cult of ugliness (1993). He 
continues as follows;
For the moment, let us say that ugly design, as opposed to 
classical design (where adherence to the golden mean and a 
preference for balance and harmony serve as the foundation 
for even the most unconventional compositions) is the 
layering of unharmonious graphic forms in a way that 
results in confusing messages (1993, 53).
On the other hand, the representatives of the contemporary imagery 
confront such criticisms by manifesting their aim as challenging the 
sterility of universal design. In such an attempt, Lorraine Wild, 
one of the representatives of the Cranbrook style, asserts that when
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the audience change, and the production techniques change, messages 
also have to change (1992) (fig. 6.)* Stressing the influence of 
computers on all design practices in ways young designers enter the 
field, projects are managed, offices are run and design is consumed. 
Wild posits that the influence of computers on graphic design is 
even greater. Whereas one can see the final work after it is 
transferred from the computer into the actual world in other 
disciplines that are concerned with three-dimensionality, in graphic 
design, designers need not apply for other means for the 
construction or the execution of the real product; because, what is 
seen on the monitor is already the outcome. Thus, for instance, 
while graphic designers once had to work with typesetters to cast 
and prepare the text, they can now perform the similar activity 
themselves on the computer. Other than the obligation to wait for 
the results of exterior processes, the shifting of such processes 
into the computer gives designers the freedom to make experiments on 
their own, which in the case of the elimination of the typesetting 
process have lead the way to an explosion of font designs. In this 
context, emphasizing the consecutive relationship of the 
contemporary imagery with the contemporary technology, Lorraine Wild 
responds to the criticisms by accusing them for neglecting the 
"Modernist impulse to submit aesthetics to the demands of the 
machine" and discarding the influence of technology on the 
contemporary works (1992, 76).
From one point of view, as it is already manifest in designers' 
statements, the contemporary works of graphic design can be depicted 
as a critical rebellion against the modernist discourse of the 
discipline (fig. 7.).
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Referring to Habemas who evaluates postmodern as the response of a 
society against the repression of the system that the process of 
modernism had presented (1994)^ it can be proposed that contemporary 
works aim at challenging the primary concern of graphic design which 
strictly insists on effortless visual communication. Lorraine Wild 
expresses this attitude explicitly in her comment on the "failed 
ideology of Modernism";
"Design is communication." "Design is problem solving." One 
hears these clichés repeated endlessly^ the mantra of the 
graphic designers stuck in the denial and anger phases of 
mourning for a time when we thought that the values by 
which we lived and defined ourselves made sense in the 
larger world (1992^ 75).
As characterized by the contemporary hybrid imagery, graphic design, 
on its behalf seems to be so successful in its rebellion that while 
it was once heavily influenced from the avant-garde art movements 
from Russian Deconstructivism to Op-Art, now it inspires 
contemporary artists such as Nam June Paik who depends on layers of 
images in his video installations.
On the other hand, from another point of view, it can be questioned 
whether with what means, if not the digital medium, such an 
effective criticism of the modern could be made applicable. In this 
sense, it can be suggested that the contemporary visual language 
composed of juxtaposed layers of numerously distorted images that 
are multiplied with equally illegible typography, not only express a 
criticism but also stand as a consequence of the digital technology. 
All the overlapping placements, extreme form and color distortions,
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fragmentation of images, filter effects, transparencies that are
laid on top of each other in contemporary designs could easily be
4
achieved and established only through a medium which is as fast and 
multifarious as computers.
Essentially, at this point, the significance of the digital design 
process that gives its way to such imagery becomes apparent. Even 
though today's chaotic expression floating on the surface of design 
works might lose its popularity one day, the digital medium with all 
its promises seems to be here to stay, since it is not only making 
previous reproduction techniques obsolete but with its promises also 
insisting on its use. Computers represent all the engagements of 
technology, including 'presentness', and graphic design as always 
being hand in hand both with technology and 'what is present' can 
hardly divorce from the ministration of computers. Nevertheless, 
computers suggest a radically different design experience compared 
to the one designers used to encounter in the traditional design 
process. The consequences of the digital design process which are 
already visible in contemporary works, in relation to computers' 
mode of ordering will consequently continue to influence graphic 
design and its products which may be then manifested in different 
visual forms. Therefore, as far as the present settings make 
evident, computers with all their specific properties are promising 
to provide the setting for more radical changes in design in the 
future.
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4.2. Problems of Communicating with the Digital Medium
4.2.1. Restrictions of Software Algorithms
Computers with their conveniences and constraints involve a design 
process that is as chaotic as today's popular imagery. Their speed 
and array in creating and alternating an image bring flexibility to 
the design process, but can easily confuse designers' pre-set design 
decisions. Similarly their algorithms can guide the way; but at the 
same time give restricted control to designers.
Compared with the intricacy of the design process in the digital 
realm, it can be considered that the design activity itself consists 
of a very intricate constitution. In contrast to fields of science 
where principles, laws, or certain structures are at work, design 
deals with problems whose definitions are not exact, and solutions 
are not single. Because of the indeterminate nature of the design 
problems that make design process equally loose and inexact, Richard 
Buhanan even criticizes the linear and orderly conceptualization of 
the design process (1995). Instead, he proposes that design is a 
non-linear activity which deals with 'wicked problems' that have no 
definitive formulation, no stopping rules, no true or false 
solutions. Nevertheless, in spite of its indetermined nature, with a 
citation from Horst Rittel, Buchanan emphasizes designers' authority 
and the necessity for them to hold the control of the design 
process: "The wicked problem solver has no right to be wrong -they 
are fully responsible for their actions" (1995, 15).
When it comes to designing with computers, the pressure that such 
responsibilities exert upon designers considerably increase; because 
in order to keep the control in their hands, apart from challenging
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a wicked problem, designers have to challenge the computer's rules* 
Since computers can perform only in ways that are inscribed in their 
algorithms, at each step of the design process, designers are 
obliged to transform their ideas or images into software algorithms 
and algorithms into ideas or images, in order to advance. When they 
cannot cope with such rules, computers perform only what they 
strictly understand, thus, their algorithms seem to take design 
decisions instead of designers. Consequently, if designers want to 
have entire control over the design process, they are left no space 
to move unless they 'know' such rules and their logic, and challenge 
them at each and every step, as Neville Brody takes attention to: 
"...in order to be really in control of the machine, you must enter 
into battle with it, otherwise you always end up with default 
solutions" (1992, 14).
Starting from the first moment one steps into the territory of the 
computer, rules that vary for each software, or for each command in 
one software stand as an obstacle that can prevent designers from 
reaching the solutions they aim at. When design problems which 
generally require flexible approaches are to be solved within a 
certain logic conducted with certain fixed rules, it becomes 
relatively more difficult to control computers compared with 
previous media. Even if this situation leads designers desperately 
to solve the problem of technology with more technology, unless one 
does not initially acquire the understanding of computers' logic, 
the required results cannot be attained: "Software tools still can't 
give me that flexibility. Even if I were to use an electronic tablet 
to create my drawings on the computer, the software, as I mentioned
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before, still isn't flexible enough for шу needs" (Applin 1993, 
93) .
The specific logic of computers start to manifest itself in the way 
it maps and divides the design process according to a particular 
terminology. When a traditional medium is used, an impression on the 
paper can be referred simply as an image. However, in the digital 
medium everything needs to be articulated. Thus, the digital design 
process is not concerned with 'an image', it matters what type of a 
format it has (tiff, eps, jpeg, etc.), what type of color mode it is 
in (cmyk, rgb, duotone, etc,), or what type of a software it is 
processed with (vector, raster, hybrid, etc.). All such terms convey 
the knowledge that qualifies an image, and determine certain set of 
actions that can be taken for processing an image, so that, without 
knowing the qualities they represent one can hardly succeed.
As an example, in a raster image program like Photoshop, if one does 
not know that images are composed out of tiny, square elements 
called pixels (picture element) on a fixed grid called bitmap, one 
may never be able to get a high quality image. Due to this 
preliminary algorithm, in softwares like Photoshop, the quality of 
images are measured by their dots per inch (dpi). Consequently, 
designers have to start to work with the correct setting of dpi; 
because when the dpi of the image is increased afterwards, as the 
extra pixels will be defined by the program itself, the image will 
be coarse and never be able to gain its details back.
As David Bolter explains "A program solves a problem by breaking it 
into small, repeatable units" (1993, 121). Similarly, during the
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design process, programs break the continuity of a task and require 
it to be completed in small, articulated portions. This nevertheless 
fragments the design process. For instance, image processing depends 
on basically two types of softwares, among which raster based 
softwares allow processing of photographic images as they define an 
image in pixels, and vector based softwares allow flat, line 
drawings as they define an image by using their vectors, or x-y 
coordinates. Consequently, the former type of programs allow 
manipulation of images, where the latter is suitable for the 
processing of text. As a result, image and text which are two 
inseparable elements in a graphic design work need to be processed 
separately on the computer. This break nevertheless declines 
designers' control because they cannot govern and make manipulations 
on the design surface all at once, but have to switch back and forth 
between programs.
Not only from one program to another, but also within a single 
program the necessary design moves are to be articulated in 
successive steps. For example, whereas the gesture of the hand is 
sufficient to obtain a curvilinear text on paper, in a vector image 
program this action should be articulated. The text and the baseline 
curve should be prepared separately, one in a textbox with 
appropriate space and size; the other by cutting the appropriate arc 
out of a circle. They can, then, be joined to arrive at a piece of 
text in curvilinear form. Yet, the solution still may not be in 
sight. In Macromedia Freehand series, for instance, as an algorithm, 
the text is spinned to a curve always in clockwise direction. 
Therefore, in order to obtain the result of a counter-clockwise
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action one should 'know' that the curve must be either 'reflected' 
vertically or 'reversed'.
If one cannot articulate the necessary actions into steps that 
computer can understand, either design will come to a degree where 
it halts or advance in ways limited by simple, basic commands which 
consequently portray computers as a medium with fixed and very 
restricted possibilities: "When you're hand-drawing type, you're 
deciding everything about it... On the computer, there's only few 
routes to take that everyone is already taking" (Keaney 1993, 125)
Such simple rules which from the beginning govern the design 
process, get even more complex as the design advances. As the entire 
design process is knit with such rules, in order to be able to 
proceed along the desired route, it becomes necessary to 'think like 
computers do', that is, by using the terms softwares employ for each 
particular action and by articulating each action into separate 
steps. Essentially, this mode of ordering needs to be preserved not 
only during the interface, but through out the design process, 
beginning with the preparation of the design idea. Thus, designers 
as well as seeking ways to visualize an idea, have to plan how that 
idea can be transformed and realized on the computer. Even before 
starting to work on the computer, it becomes necessary to take 
critical decisions from the type of the appropriate softwares that 
will be used, to the size or resolution of the canvas, or the 
effects that will be used at certain intervals. As a result, 
restrictions of the softwares penetrate into the entire design 
process in the form of another constraint that needs to be 
challenged during design.
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The necessity to understand and employ computers' mode of ordering 
through out the design process^ inescapably has consequences on 
entire design thinking which nevertheless attacks designers' 
reactions:
"Digital artifacts have so permeated our lives that our 
behaviours have adjusted to them in very subtle ways. I 
think many of us have learned by necessity how we think 
logically and procedurally, I believe we've adapted to 
machines more than they have to us" (Spreenberg 1993, 
131) .
The penetration of computers into the entire design process can be 
questioned for its advantages and disadvantages, but for now, this 
situation exists as a consequence of the demands posed by the 
restrictions of computers. Adapting computer's mode of ordering can 
be observed as if computers are governing the design process, but, 
on the contrary, it is a way to govern computers themselves for 
making designs. The adaptation of computers' systematics is the sign 
of a communicative contact between the designer and the digital 
medium, and such a connection is necessary to inhabit and explore 
computers capabilities.
Such an adaptation nevertheless is always subjected to various 
hindrances. In the swift pace of digital technology where systems 
and softwares are ceaselessly renovated and sophisticated with new 
functions, it is difficult to know all the underlining algorithms at 
once and manage them in all layers of the design process. As a 
result, even if designers are acquainted with certain functions 
provided by certain softwares, the on-going modifications of the
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digital medium interrupts and delays the adaptation of computers' 
modes of ordering· New functions defined by new algorithms appear 
with every new software, and no matter what level of expertness a 
designer arrives at, they continue to interfere with the design 
process· Thus, gaps in the design process persist in ways algorithms 
do not permit the realization of necessary design steps, or orient 
another procedure towards a different direction· This challenge, in 
respect gives the digital design process its basic character in the 
form of its randomness:
My initial concepts are still arrived at away from computer 
-on paper, on restaurant napkins, while riding on the 
subway· Once I touch the computer, however, curious things 
happen· While I like to think of the computer as just 
another creative tool, I have come to recognize in it an 
element of randomness that sometimes can lead me in 
unexpected visual directions· I often find that in the 
digital realm there's a greater leap between starting and 
ending points than in the nondigital realm· This phenomenon 
has partly to do with computing power that allows for quick 
and easy experimentation· The time costs of such 
experimentation in nondigital media is far greater 
(Weeramantry 1997, 142).
4.2.2. Multiplicity of Options
Apart from the supremacy of algorithms that underline each step of 
the design process, computers open a broad space for designers with 
their multiple options ready to manipulate an image· Algorithms 
determine how a particular task can be performed, however there are
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a variety of algorithms, and a task can be performed in various 
different ways* Thus, on the computer there are almost infinite ways 
to go from one point to another· Due to the multiplicity of the 
roads that can be taken, designers can easily get confused and feel 
lost during the digital design process· Since the variety of options 
suggest numerous different paths to take, even the use of time that 
is supposed to be economical in the digital realm, turns out to be 
an expenditure: "It's not faster, actually; I probably spend more 
time on projects now than I used to, because there's so many more 
options" (Gilmore 1993, 137)·
In addition to already at hand options that can be employed to 
manipulate an image, their overimposed permutations reach the 
multiplicity of alternatives almost to an infinite number· In this 
way, not the fixed nature of the computer, but its flexible 
properties manifested in the form of the multiplicity of options 
cause deviations on the design process· Since the paths that can be 
taken are various, designers have to challenge the possible 
bifurcations that waits on the way in order to keep their pre­
planned path to attain the design they aim at· For this purpose, 
designers' capability to make judgements and select the appropriate 
alternatives among mmierous possibilities becomes essential, as 
designer Earl Gee suggests, "The computer does not act as a 
filtering device, the way your mind does; it can show 10^000 ways 
how not to do something as well as 10^000 ways how to do it" (1993, 
42).
Most commonly, as the multiplicity of options never cease to 
interfere with the design process, multiple alternatives for a
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particular design problem can be developed· Exploiting different 
design alternatives in a short time although seems to be an 
advantage^ it has many drawbacks· First of all^ their perplexing 
degree can put the design activity into a loop, where it can 
continue virtually forever· As a designer explains, "What makes 
multimedia so interesting is its digital nature, because a given 
project is, in a sense, never "final,' never finished; it's 
eternally editable and transmutable" (Aufuldish 1997, 99)· Also,
the possibility to obtain alternative solutions can confuse 
designers to a degree that it avoids them from envisioning the final 
product. After each command, the computer works to complete the 
given task; however, due to the variety of commands that can be 
applied one after another in a short time, and the continuous 
deviation of the image due to such overexposition of layers of 
commands, designers can come to a degree where they can hardly know 
or foresee the result. Thus, as Bruce Yelaska forewarns, "Because 
computers have an almost infinite amount of capability, you can make 
an infinite amount of time-consuming changes if you don't think the 
problem through beforehand" (1993, 24). Finally, instead of
selecting and elaborating one alternative, designers can engage 
themselves in combining every appealing alternative on a single 
surface which can easily lead the way to overdesign;
"If computers have a problem, it's that some people don't 
know when to stop. Overdesigning is a concern. There are 
just too many variations available. Some people get stuck 
perfecting one design that ends up looking great in the 
trash " (Bright 1993, 18).
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TGie L ord is my shepherd;
I shall not want.
He maketh me to lie down
in green pastures: 
he leadeth me
beside the still waters.
He restoreth m y soul: 
he leadeth me
in the paths o f  righteousness  
for his n a m e ’s sake.
Y e a ,  th o u gh  I w alk  th ro u g h  the valley  
o f  the s h a d o w  o f  d e a t h ,
I will f e a r  no evil:  
fo r  t h o u  a r t  w i t h  m e ;
th y  rod and th y  s ta f f  
th e y  c o m fo r t  me.
T h o u  p re p a re s t  a ta b le  b e fo re  m e
in th e  p resence  o f  m in e  en em ie s  
th o u  a n o i n t e s t  m y  h e a d  w i t h  oil,  
m y  c u p  r u n n e t h  o v e r.
S u r e ly  g o o d n e s s  a n d  m e r c y  
sha ll  f o l l o w  m e  
all t h e  d a y s  o f  m y  l ife :  
a n d  I w i l l  d w e l l
In t h e  h o u s e  o f  t h e  l_ORD  
f o r  e v e r .
Fig. 8.
An application of
David Knuth’s ’Metafonf program.
In every step, a tiny shift in 28 parameters 
govern the overall appearance of the typeface 
1982
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options is not only peculiar to computer softwares, but a feature 
that digital technology presents in general which makes design 
process equally complicated· From Internet to digital archives, or 
from additional filters to scanning, digital technology presents 
various sources for obtaining images. Image CDs even offer materials 
in masks, ready for cut, copy and paste into a design. Such 
possibilities even turn design into a ready-made activity where 
designers only have to select the best among a range of different 
options. This situation promises to change the status of graphic 
designers into image-processors who are responsible from processing 
raw images rather than producing them. However, the necessity to 
make appropriate and correct decisions still lingers as a 
challenging part of the design responsibility.
The multiplicity of options, that demand challenge from designers to 
sustain their control on the design process, on another hand acts as 
a concept that underlines the entire structure of digital technology 
which can go to extremes in the form of softwares that can 
automatically make mutations on patterns or typefaces. Displaying 
almost an ironical approach to the fact that designers should be 
responsible from everything concerning their designs, such programs 
are able to alternate image or text themselves. One example to such 
softwares is Donald Knuth's 'Metafont' program which according to 
its inscribed parameters allow mutations on the typeface as it is 
being written (fig. 8.). "It starts out in an old-fashioned, highly 
serifed typeface and gradually modulates into a modernistic, sans- 
serif typeface. Each step, imperceptible on its own, is accomplished
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by making a tiny shift in 28 parameters governing the overall 
appearance of the computerized alphabet" (Hofstadter 1985, 241).
In ways resembling Knuth's program, KPT filters that attaches to the 
Photoshop program, allow various transformations on an image; but 
this time the decision for the amount of mutation is left to the 
user. Nevertheless, for example, in KPT Texture Explorer when a 
level of metamorphosis from "mini' to 'meta' is selected, the 
program proceeds to display not only the result but sixteen other 
different alternatives according to its parameters. In this way, 
program permits uncountable permutations as if to support Kunth's 
thesis by which he proposes that with computers we are in a position 
to "describe not just a thing in itself but how that thing would 
vary" (1985, 240).
From the perspective such automatic image alternating engines open, 
it can be considered that designers' contract for controlling 
possible bifurcations during the design process is, in a way, 
released. With a perversion on the design scheme, designers are put 
in a position where they can give computer the command to mutate and 
produce alternatives of a design themselves. In other words, instead 
of challenging the multiplicity of options, designers can order 
computers to create accidents for themselves. With this twist that 
turns the disadvantages into an advantage, designers attain a 
different level of control which is more flexible and which 
tolerates a room to communicate with the computer for inspiration.
In this way, rather than insisting on a fixed form in their designs, 
designers can integrate the capacities of softwares into their
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works; but^ still, it will be them who are to decide where to order 
the program to stop.
4.2.3. Knowledge Gap: Bricolage on Computer
The restrictions of software algorithms and the multiplicity of 
options continuously interrupt the design process by intensifying at 
each step the insufficiency of designers' knowledge to overcome such 
interference. Designers not only need to know how and with what 
terms they can conduct and realize a specific task, but also 
necessitate the knowledge on how they can handle accidental results 
that may await them after an indecisive command. Consequently this 
brings forth a problem of knowledge gap in designers communication 
with the computer.
As exemplary to illustrate the urgency of this problem, various 
manuals on image processing softwares are published everyday in 
attempt to find a remedy. For instance, for Photoshop, 227 different 
articles from books to videos or CDs can be found on Internet, in 
Amazon Bookstore, whose aim vary from giving basic training to 
showing hints of wizardry. The high mamber of materials compiled for 
a single software as well as illustrating a drastic demand for 
knowledge, certifies the shortage of such manuals to overcome the 
problem of knowledge gap. The ineffectiveness of such guidebooks, 
however, can hardly be evaluated as extraordinary, since the idea of 
using manuals contradict with the fluidity of design. Trying to 
follow a manual while designing at the same time, staggers the 
digital design process which is already suffering from 
interruptions. Thus, generally, rather than for learning a subject
124
matterr manuals are referred to solve specific problems, only when 
there is something apparently wrong; as SCET (Scotland Council for 
Education in Technology) chief executive Nigel Paine have declared 
in a speech: "Only sad people read manuals" (1998)·
In a condition where designers cannot attain sufficient knowledge, 
the design process on the computer depends usually on the genuine 
insight and experience of the designer activated with a factor of 
chance. This is reminiscent of Claude Lévi-Strauss' term 'bricolage' 
by which he refers to an activity that involves making use of 
whatever is at hand (1994). Thus, as opposed to an engineered work 
that has a design and determined materials for it, through bricolage 
one proceeds by utilizing every material and all chances that come 
on the way. Similarly, April Greiman, who is one of the leading 
figures in current graphic design, manifests;
...or an accident will happen and you'll say, 'oh, that is 
terrific, let's go that way!'. Then you're off on a new 
idea. This pioneering, where you don't have an aesthetic 
and you don't have a tradition, is both time consuming and 
wonderful. To feel lost is great (1990, 56).
Thus, designers proceed by making use of everything at hand, even 
sometimes storing fragments of scraps which remain from alternative 
design solutions in a file, like a 'bricoleur' who collects any 
material for he thinks it can be used in anyway later on. Likewise, 
it can be suggested that even the image stocks or digital image 
archives follow this bricoleur's principle of gathering and 
arranging, since they employ raw and potent visual material which 
can be used in anyway.
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Bricolage, on another hand recalls the type of technological 
knowledge which Carl Mitcham refers as 'using unconscious 
sensorimotor awareness' (1978), since it involves intuitive trials 
before even not being able to foresee the results· Still, in the 
digital design process, designers also employ their experience on 
the medium derived from rules of thumb and empirical laws which 
sharpens their vision· However, because of its experimental nature, 
in the digital design process, conditions keep changing and it is 
difficult to guarantee that you can obtain a desired solution 
because you have once obtained it· For instance, while using KPT 
filters, every time you allow mutations of the image, changes are 
imposed upon each other; and since the program is unable to return 
to previous steps, it is almost impossible to obtain an image that 
you have encountered along the way as long as you do not remember 
all the steps you have taken exactly· In this way, only rule of 
thumb becomes 'save the images immediately if you think its worth 
it', i^e·, collect everything which can be used later on·
Bricolage with its properties pertaining to idleness naturally 
contradicts with the design discourse that fundamentally emphasizes 
planning prior to guesswork and evaluates design in orderly 
concluded sequences· It appears incongruent to traditional design 
models like that of Bruce Archers' which depicts design process 
composed of basically six successive phases as "programming, data 
collection, analysis, synthesis, development and communication" that 
are verified at each time with feedbacks (qtd· in Cross 1989, 24)·
Still, Mark Siprut in Adobe Photoshop Handbook, suggests it as way 
to design with computers, at least when using Photoshop: "You can 
learn almost any program by methodically plowing through each and
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every command in sequence, but in Photoshop the tendency is to play 
with the features, creating 'happy accidents'" (1995, xxvi).
At this instant, one may question whether there are not any 
accidents in traditional media, and if so, what is their difference 
from the ones that occur in the digital realm. The way watercolor 
flows on the surface of paper, or the way oil paint stamps divers 
textures on canvas seems to follow a course of accident. In marble, 
the remaining impressions are even capable of inspiring Mandelbrot. 
To study this, it is then helpful to compare the notions of 
'spontaneity' and 'chance' by referring to Aristotle for whom 'art 
loves chance and chance loves art'. In Physics, he discriminates 
'chance' from 'spontaneity' by suggesting that, "The difference 
between spontaneity and what results by chance is greatest in things 
that come to be by nature; for when anything comes to be contrary to 
nature, we do not say that it came to be by chance, but spontaneity" 
(II, 6). From this perspective, the randomness that is present in 
traditional media can be evaluated as a feature stemming from their 
nature, emerging 'spontaneously' like the liquidity of watercolor 
which lets it flow on a surface. Computers on the other hand, are 
not programmed to act randomly. Except specifically designed 
programs, they cannot make coincidences themselves. They perform 
what they strictly understand, therefore, the coincidental results 
one encounters in the design process are not due to their nature. 
But to users who encounter unexpected results, the coincidental 
forms are accidents that stem from an external cause. As a result, 
it becomes more appropriate to refer the randomness in computers as 
accidental.
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still, as Aristotle remarks, "every result of chance is from what is 
spontaneous, but not everything that is from what is spontaneous is 
from chance" (Physics II, 6). From which it is possible to arrive 
at the conclusion that the accidents on computers belong to 
spontaneity at a broader level. Yet, designers are capable of 
dealing with the spontaneity of traditional media by initializing 
their nature, but they remain disconnected to computers where 
coincidences appear external, or accidental. Thus, in order to 
perceive things as flowing spontaneously, an initialization or 
connection to the ordering of computer is necessary. So that if not 
the nature of computers, the nature of digital design process can 
be, then, depicted as spontaneous.
On the other hand, the presence of accidents gives the impression 
that designing with computers lack any orderly relationship. As a 
matter of fact, in spite of its random look, digital design process 
involves a pattern like every chaotic structure has. This pattern is 
composed of the cycle between computers' and designers' judgements, 
accidents and design decisions, during communication. Although, it 
does not have a linear path, with twists and turns, back and forth 
jumps, new arrangements that emerge continuously, this pattern has 
some self-organization that seeks for a particular density which 
will complete the design. In a way, digital design process resembles 
Kepler's method, which on his study on interparallel computer 
systems James Bailey describes as "like the child who having picked 
up a mass of wild flowers tries to arrange them in a posy this way, 
and then tries another way, exploring possible combinations and 
harmonies" (1996, 73). For Bailey, Kepler's discovery which proved
planetary motion as elliptical by breaking the perfect circle, was
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possible because "he did not constrain the form of the answer" in 
the beginning; i.e. without foreseeing an end, he was up to 
arranging the data in his hands.(1996, 73).
Kepler's method which inspires interparallel computers which are to 
replace sequential systems in today's technology, can be further 
explored within the terrain of 'nomad thought', that replaces the 
closed equation of representation (x=x=not y), with an open equation 
(...+y+z+a...). Therein, in his foreword to Deleuze and Guattari's 
'A Thousand Plateaus', Brian Massumi explains 'nomad thought' as 
follows :
Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, 
reducing their manyness to the One of identity, and 
ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate 
circumstances in a shattering blow. It synthesizes a 
multiplicity of elements without effacing their 
heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future 
rearranging (to the contrary) (1987, xiii).
Kepler's method which continuously folds different arrangements by 
using multiple entryways instead of channelling towards a linear 
sequence illustrate an attempt, a trial of 'nomad thought'. 
Likewise, the design activity on computers which can bifurcate to 
all possible directions, form a pattern or a "map" in Deleuze and 
Guattari's terms which is "open and connectable in all of its 
dimensions; ... detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant 
modification" (1987, 12). Every design completes a different
pattern in the similar fashion; as images fold upon each other, one
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uses every potent material, rises up at any point with an 'undo' 
command, and can take dissimilar directions.
This still sounds irregular and random, but is the only way that 
design can work efficiently. Bailey gives an example of ant colony, 
where individual ants forage for food randomly in diverse places and 
return by leaving a chemical trail for others to follow. When food 
source runs out no more chemicals are left, so that traces fade away 
and new ones can be created by other ants who find another source. 
If all ants follow a genuine route instead of taking disperse paths, 
other sources will be missed. If they wait for the location of food 
to be known before they attempt to go, they will again, starve. 
Thus, Bailey suggests "all the process requires is enough individual 
'agents' and enough randomness" (1996, 175). Likewise, all digital
design process needs is enough knowledge and enough randomness. It 
is vain therefore to refer the digital design process as comprising 
of a system which is out of control; because this activity as a 
whole belongs to a different realm where many things, -design 
knowledge and computer algorithms, functions and options, real and 
virtual interact; and the sum is the influence they exert upon each 
other.
A designer suggests; "Remember your roots. The computer makes a lot 
of prepress techniques easier, but in itself can't create context, 
design, or expression. It's only a tool. Remember that, and you've 
got what you need to do good work. Like paper or clay, the computer 
is a medium, with its own quirks (Applin 1997, 97). But, if
computers are conceptualized as 'just like other tools' and fixed 
the way tools are, it is very probable that designers will starve
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like an ant colony which insists on using an exhausted route· By 
following such instrumental scheme, one can only get what can be 
expected from paper or clay. Thus, in this context, it can be 
considered that the actual knowledge gap originates from not knowing 
how to initialize and connect to the very possibilities of 
computers.
Nevertheless, this problem can not be deciphered as long as the 
digital design process is approached with the parameters of the 
traditional design models. For this reason, it is necessary to 
remember that with their own rules and capabilities computers 
communicate a different design composition. The digital design 
process is actually performed in a simulated medium, not on a table 
with paints, pen or paper; but in cyberspace which not only for 
Lyotard but also for Paul Virilio ’has a different logic" (1996).
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4.3. What Computers Communicate
4.3.1. Real-Time At All Times
"A very fulfilling aspect of digital design is its inmediacy. 
Designers can now view the final results of their efforts almost 
instantly" states Spreenberg (1997, 133). Therewith, one of the
primary qualities of computers can be specified as their ability to 
work in real-time; that is, the ability of computers to respond as 
simultaneously as possible to the given commands. Simply, because of 
their simultaneousness in following the users' string of commands, 
computers are considered as following users' time which in its 
literal sense is conceptualized as 'passing'. However in the 
electrical zone, the succession of time is different basically due 
to the 'undo' command that introduces the flexibility of rewinding 
and forwarding in time.
Jessica Helfand criticizes the concept of 'real-time' for creating a 
fallacy because it is "understood to be immediate time, everything- 
at-once time, time without interruptions or delay" and proposes that 
real-time is actually what humans do (1996, 8). Nevertheless, in
spite of her accuracy in differentiating the time belonging to 
computers' realm from the one belonging to human experience, it 
should be noted that interruptions also exist in computers. Every 
back and forth movement, every cut, every break that connects to a 
flow is an interruption. Therefore, interruptions that create the 
sense of time in daily life also create a perception of time in 
computers; but differently, this is a time that users conduct. 
Arguing that technology permits and presents a management of time, 
Paul Virilo suggests that VCRs that are capable of rewinding.
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fastforwarding, pausing or slowing time give people the capability 
to montage another day for themselves:
The technology of the VCR creates a day, an additional 
false-day; you have a secondary day which comes into being 
for you alone.·. That's just like a day that emerges for 
you, which is staged; there is a sort of electronic 
cosmography" (1991, 187).
Similarly on the computer, through the agencies of undoing or 
redoing, a different time experience is created which is particular 
to the mediiim. It can be a false experience, but not a fake one. The 
time constructed in the computer rather than being imitative, has 
its own qualities which consequently differentiates computers from 
other media in graphic design.
In the case of graphic design, the 'undo' command, as well as 
'redo', 'save', or 'save as/a copy' commands, which are available in 
every image processing software, give the designers the opportunity 
to conduct time. Designers can go back in time, start to work on the 
design from any phase, return to a previous step again which may at 
each time direct the design to a different path. Due to the 
capabilities of these commands, in the digital design process past, 
present and future continuously shift places to an extent that their 
differences disappear. For example, on the 'history menu', in 
Photoshop 5.0 , one can see all the moves, every 'click' of the 
mouse made during the design process. On this menu, one can at any 
time, jump any number of steps to the past, which then becomes 
present, or then return to the previously present step which is now 
at the future station of the menu.
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Similarly, "save' or 'save as/a copy' commands increase the range of 
'undo' and 'redo' which gives more flexibility to the management of 
time in computers. The mamber of 'undo's are adjustable, but still 
limited with the maximum number that depends on the software. 
Besides, 'undo's are ineffective after a file or computer is closed. 
Thus, whereas 'undo's are ineffective, the 'save as' command acts in 
order to 'pause' critical points. If a copy of the critical turns 
are 'saved', one can return to them at any time, and start again 
from a particular step in the past. Thus, like computer games where 
players advance by saving critical moments in case that they can 
return before they attempt to take a risk, in design it is possible 
to save an image which you may want to return, or which you think 
may be useful later on.
On the other hand, in cyberspace as it is difficult to discriminate 
past, present, and future, it is equally difficult to talk about 
time. The continuous displacements of past, present and future, 
suggest computers almost as a model of John Ellis McTaggart's theory 
that states 'time does not exist at all' (1993). Therein, he 
basically proposes that the distinctions of past, present and future 
which suggest change are essential to time. However, their
determinations are incompatible, because every event can posses all 
three. Due to this contradiction McTaggart proposes that talking 
about past, present, and future does not make sense, they do not 
exist, therefore, time does not exist, -it is unreal. Arguing on 
McTaggart's proposition which had already confronted many criticisms 
and judge whether time 'really' exists or not is beyond the confines 
of this study. Still, McTaggart's discussion on time that refers to 
the relationships of past, present and future is helpful to
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understand the experience of time in computers· Accordingly^ 
cyberspace which is already denounced as virtual, can be considered 
as timeless, because of the lack of reference to what is past, 
present or future. Thus, if not users' organic time which Virilio 
defines as "the time it takes for plants to grow", computers' time, 
beyond being real-time, is stuck perpetually in real-time (1991, 
193) .
Computers that do not determine or order time themselves, but allow 
users to manipulate it, present diverse effects to the design 
process. Initially, due to their quality devoid of the restrictions 
of time, on the computer a design can theoretically be processed 
forever:
"The Macintosh doesn't have a 'no' button, meaning you can 
create almost an infinite number of variations on one idea. 
What we need is a feature that will have the machine stop 
you after you've created ten different options for the same 
idea" (Brody 1992, 14).
Nevertheless, although computers seem to obscure the design process 
by offering designers the ability to conduct time, this at the same 
gives designers the ability to conduct the design process itself. 
Thus, it becomes possible to take experimental routes, flow freely 
between different steps of the design and restart from any point, at 
any time. As a result, in the digital process, the designer is 
endowed with 'perpetual newness' which in effect provides great 
flexibility along the design process compared with the customary 
methods where experiments are time taking and risky since a mistake 
on the paper can necessitate the repetition of the whole process
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starting from the beginning· Consequently, this marks one of the 
primary differences of the digital design process from the design 
process experienced through the application of traditional media·
4.3.2. Remote Touch
Another variance that distinguishes computers and detaches them from 
traditional design media is the experience of space in the digital 
realm where the two dimensionality of the paper leaves its place to 
an inwards extension devoid of any boundary or gravity· Calling the 
experience of this space as "telesthesia -perception at a distance", 
McKenzie Wark writes "This is our "virtual geography,' the 
experience of which doubles, troubles, and generally permeates our 
experience of the space we experience firsthand" (1994, vii)·
The entire design task carried on in this telesthesiatic space is as 
far as a light year distance, yet as close as the 'mouse' in the 
palm· In this space, the notion of touch remains, but it is 
transformed into a new form as Virilio discusses;
Cyberspace is a new form of perspective· It does not 
coincide with the audio-visual perspective which we already 
know· It is a fully new perspective, free of any previous 
reference; it is a tactile perspective· To see at a 
distance, to hear at a distance; that was the essence of 
the audio-visual perspective of old· But to reach at a 
distance, to feel at a distance, that amounts to shifting 
the perspective towards a domain it did not yet encompass; 
that of contact, of contact-at-a-distance; tele-contact 
(1996).
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In this space which can be remotely touched, the experience that the 
designer is subjected to may be compared to Angelo Beyerland’s 
analysis in 1900 by which he suspected typewriter for 
’disarticulating the relays that allow the circular translation from 
mind to hand to eye to mind";
In writing by hand, the eye must constantly watch the 
written line...guide the hand through each movement. For 
this is the written line, particularly the line being 
written, must be visible. By contrast, after one presses 
down briefly on a key, the typewriter creates in the proper 
position on the paper a complete letter, which not only is 
untouched by the writer ’ s hand but also located in a place 
entirely apart from where hands work" (qtd. in Seltzer 
1992, 10).
When computers are concerned designers' response are no different, 
like Duane M. Palyka, who comments that when computers are inserted 
in the design process an extra dimension is added. This dimension is 
nevertheless considered as a problematic one where "images did not 
flow directly from the artist’s hand, but came from a more 
mechanical process that allows the artist only limited control" 
(1989, 46). Similarly, another designer, Sally Ann Applin asserts:
The computer is a tool, like index cards or a sketchbook. I 
use all of these, but for my preliminary "idea" work, I 
favour analog media. I wouldn't say I "eschew" the 
computer; it's just that there is something about typing in 
front of a machine that takes my thoughts away from my 
drawing hands (1997, 92).
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However, this space is not devoid of any sense of touch, it is just 
remote or consisting of 'tele' contact· In the virtual depth of the 
computer, like the way 'undo' and 'redo' commands provide a 
management of time, the 'zoom in' and 'zoom out' commands both 
connects one to its space and offers this time, the management of 
space· If not directly physical, it is possible to contact with this 
space through a visionality that maps the space in and out, up and 
down in all possible directions; and it is done immediately, with 
the click of a hand· As Seltzer argues "The electric switch, ready 
to hand, promises to reconnect the interrupted links between 
conception and execution, agency and expression··· posits an 
identity between signal and act and an identity between 
communication and execution" (1992, 11)·
Nevertheless, in order to be able to consider the computer as an 
immediate link to the mind, as suggested by Seltzer, one has to 
inhabit the terminal space and its logic· From this perspective, it 
appears that, the relationship between designers and the virtual 
space of the computer depends on the way designers approach the 
terminal space; whether they conceptualize themselves as an outsider 
to the computer’s realm or develop a computer awareness and 
appropriate a 'technological mode of being' for themselves·
4.3.3. Sketch as the Original
Another quality that discriminates computers is their capability to 
circumscribe the entire design process without altering sketches 
from execution. Digital technology which has long been provoking 
debates on the idea of the original, similarly introduces graphic
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design a controversial setting where only originals exist. The 
difference between a sketch and an executed work that is visible to 
the eye on paper, disappears when it comes to computers. Due to 
their exactness and precision, computers give finish to every image 
and display it like an executed work. Thus, passing over the sketch 
phase, what is seen on the screen immediately turns out to be the 
finished work, or an original without a sketch.
On the other hand, in graphic design because of the affinity of 
computers to the original work, computers are considered as suitable 
to the last appointment of the design process where the original 
work is realized. Accordingly, the general tendency is to make the 
sketches first, and then use computers as an easy layout implement 
as if typing the drafts of a paper. If not the conceptual 
preparation, making visual drafts before the computer however 
contradicts with the succession of the digital design process. Thus, 
primarily, when computer interferes the design process, it becomes 
difficult to insist on the sketched or planned visual solution. Even 
if it is possible to challenge the computer to attain the preplanned 
imagery, this time, such an attitude discharges the possibilities 
that computers can present.
On the other hand, instead of challenging to eliminate the 
possibilities of the computers, one may try to envision and make 
sketches according to the possible visual results that can be 
achieved on the computer. However, even when working on the computer 
it is not possible to foresee the exact results. In a condition 
where images deviate and multiply continuously, it is equally 
difficult to sketch the possible outcome computer can leave on the
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image beforehand· As a result, dividing sketch and execution phases 
in the computers and employing them only as layout machines excludes 
the potentials of computers from the design process·
As a matter of fact, using computers like typing machines not only 
disregards their capacities, but also contradicts with their 
particular nature that permits to experience the entire design 
process within the boundaries of the digital realm· Certain 
functions such as 'copy', 'paste', 'trace', or 'layers' allow 
manipulation of the design elements in several ways through 
displacing and placing them in different permutations· These 
commands operate almost in the similar fashion with a tracing paper, 
where one draws, erases, adds, or subtracts design elements, and 
tries different compositions· The way image processing softwares 
allow manipulations on design, makes it worth considering the 
digital medium as suitable for making sketches as well· Furthermore, 
carrying the design process through the computer in its totality 
suggests a possibility to recognize and make use of all the 
capacities it involves· It is nevertheless, equivalent to obtaining 
the ability of communicating with computers through which they can 
be used more beneficially·
The conceptualization of the computer merely as a layout medium like 
other customary media, attributes indifference to this digital 
medium· However, if computers are indifferent, the next question 
worth for asking becomes, what is then the reason of using computers 
while previous media can serve for the same purpose· Common 
depiction of computers as a simulation of previous media lends 
computer as a tool which can be used like them; but the way
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computers gather all previous media in their formation, doubling and 
multiplying their capabilities within a different realm of time and 
space, suggests that computers are something more than a mere tool.
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4.4. The Computer Conscious Designer
Emancipated from the concrete constraints of the traditional design 
process, the way designers advance in the digital medium is 
consequently different with its own flow of time, its own space, its 
own rules that govern its own map of intertwining paths. For this 
reason, approaching computers' "symmetrical reality" with reference 
to traditional schemes and trying to appropriate the digital design 
process to traditional design methods means to bypass the 
potentialities of this medium (Virilio 1996).
Gene Youngblood takes attention to such potentiality by referring to 
computers with a term coined by Alan Kay, as "metamedium": "computer 
[is] a universal machine, a metamedium that will contain and become 
all media" (1989, 10). He discusses that "This capacity of the
universal machine to 'become' many things while actually being none 
of them is known in computer jargon as 'virtuality'. The computer is 
a virtual typewriter, a virtual camera, a virtual piano, a virtual 
person, a virtual universe that contains, among other paradoxes, 
virtual computers." (1989, 13). In this context, Youngblood
concludes by stating that as a virtual entity, computer is a 
simulacrum, the product of simulation. Nevertheless, against all the 
negative connotations of the word simulation in Baudrillard's sense, 
he essentially proposes that "if we are to construct a new culture 
in which to live, the map must necessarily precede the territory. 
[And] Simulation is the prerequisite to transformation, mutation, 
secession" (1989, 14).
As a matter of fact, Gilles Deleuze underlines such a productivity 
accommodated in the concept of simulation. Therein, he discriminates
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simulation from copy, by arguing that copy relies on resemblance by 
imitation, whereas simulation is constituted by its difference from 
the original:
"The simulacrum is built upon a disparity or upon a 
difference· It internalizes a dissimilarity· This is why we 
can no longer define it in relation to a model imposed on 
the copies, a model of the Same from which the copies' 
resemblance derives" (1990, 258)·
Referring simulation as a false copy, as a 'false pretender', 
Deleuze suggests that simulation is capable of breaking its ties 
with both the original and copy· As Brian Massumi summarizes; 
"Simulation is not, as it is for Baudrillard, a closure of history 
(a crisis of hypercopying) but, on the contrary, an action (like a 
productive piece of reading···)" (qtd· in Morris 1993, 40)·
Respectively, the depiction of computers as simulation does not 
necessarily equalize them with the previous media· The digital 
medium has its own organization which is attributed with its 
difference from traditional media, and its more productive to 
approach computers in the scope of such differences· Nevertheless, 
by referring to Marshall McLuhan, Deleuze suggests that McLuhan not 
only pointed out that every media has its own mode of expression, 
but essentially that, they have their own structure for creative 
possibilities· If such structures are applied to another media, it 
is nothing but the assassination of the latter (1992)· In this 
sense, if we approach the digital medium as the simulation of other 
media employed in graphic design, we will simply narrow the range of 
possibilities that are available on the computer· Similarly, like
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limiting the possibilities of computers by approaching and using 
them like the previous media, previous media can be also limited or 
'assassinated' in Deleuze’s terms by enforcing them to wear the 
qualities that make the metamedium. Nevertheless, such a reversed 
situation is already taking place. Due to the popularity of the 
digitally produced images, designers who feel uncomfortable with the 
new medium now try to use their old media, -the pen, and the 
collage, and the airbrush or the photograph, to create such imagery 
which is nevertheless an effort incongruous and dishonest to the 
nature of such media. Whatever the technique is, trying to produce 
like the mathematical algorithms of a computer, is not only a 
superfluous effort; but also an activity that basically ruins the 
expressive qualities of both the medium and the hand.
In order not to limit the possibilities of all media, then, their 
structure and nature should be considered. In this context, it is 
unproductive to employ computers as mere tools to visualize hand- 
drawn sketches or make the typesetting of the necessary texts. With 
their numerous capabilities, computers stand as a medium in which 
the design process can be constructed from its beginning to the end, 
from the tracing of an idea to the final retouching of the image, 
step by step through exploring all the possibilities presented to 
the user. They should be treated not as an exterior step in the 
design process but rather as the setting where the design process is 
experienced within its own inhabited space.
Considering computers like other media confines them to the 
instrumental view of technology, which restricts their capabilities 
with the capabilities of existing media and puts a distance to their
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own faculties by suggesting to conduct them as a tool. Though, it is 
possible to attempt to conduct computers like a tool, exploring 
their own range is a more productive act. Rather than 
conceptualizing computers as mere instruments, it is more productive 
to approach them as an attitude, an expression, or an existential 
mode.
Deleuze and Guattari with their concept of introjection, as the 
"perverse use of the machine and tool", as a matter of fact explain 
the experience most of the graphic designers encounter in the realm 
of the computer (1973, 119). As illustrating the instance which 
embodies a chance of releasement from the instrumental mode of 
approaching technology, the notion of introjection distinguishes a 
new consciousness governing the relationship of man and the machine. 
Designers who attain this consciousness by getting involved in the 
logic of the computer instead of exteriorizing it or limiting it 
with already existing schemes, may therefore not only release their 
alienation but open a productive gateway to the still unexplored 
paths of the digital design process.
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5. CONCLUSION
Couldn't our inability to see our 
way out of what feels like such a 
mess be a problem of perception and 
not design?
Douglas Rushkoff, 
Children of Chaos
David Bolter, in his discussion on the autonomy of computers, states 
that considering computers as machines will emphasize their autonomy 
and independence from human control; thus he suggests to consider 
computers as tools, since it will give more control or ”a more 
effective grasp of his physical and intellectual milieu" to the user 
(1993, 233). However, it requires a plenty amount of effort to 
forget the interference of computers with the design process, after 
each step where one can easily get perplexed and slip the grasp of 
his pre-planned path, in challenging a different command. Therefore,
I believe that 'computers can simulate many tools but it is not 
itself a tool' as Alan Kay proposes. If there still has to be a 
reference to tools, then "computer tools are programs that transform 
the machine into various kinds of levers and fulcra" that not only 
propose a more complicated system then ever; but also lift the whole 
design process, its considerations, constraints and succession to a 
different plane (Youngblood 1989, 11).
Computers involve various pathways advancing in their own time, 
circumscribed with their own space, and guided with their own rules,
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which may resemble previous media; yet more complex in their logic 
and communication with the user than the early means that men 
employed for processing their thoughts.
Today, as it can also be observed from recent publications and 
products, computers have found widespread acceptance as an integral 
part of the graphic design discipline. Designers and design critics 
evaluate digitally produced images, explain how they work with the 
digital medium, compare it to the previous media, discuss its 
creative aspects, argue its ethical dimensions, suggest how 
computers should be integrated to the design education, inform about 
the recent developments in digital technology, recommend how to use 
each software, introduce upgrades, notice their constraints and 
advantages and so on; however hardly few of them try to elaborate 
computers conscious of the fact that it is a different medium which 
necessitates to adapt a different attitude. As Steven Holtzman 
suggests, "What's really exciting about the digital medium is that 
everyone's going to have a computer. Everyone's going to have 
access. What everyone won't have is the new way of thinking -the 
ability to immerse yourself in a very fast and fragmented world, and 
absorb what's going on around you as a unified whole" (1997, 257).
Computers in contrast with their practical virtues seem to present a 
chaotic design process which intensely challenges designers' 
control. However, once their logic is inhabited, it is possible to 
perceive the pattern determined by a communicative relationship. 
Yet, by approaching computers within an instrumental ordering, one 
can neither recognize nor be able to practice such a pattern.
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Wendy Richmond, arguing on the influence of computers on life, 
arrives at a very accurate conclusion, as "We do not use 
technologies as much as we live them" (1996, 141)· Then, proceeding 
along similar line, it should be noted that 'to live technology' 
necessitates to be conscious about technology; just like 'designing 
with technology' that requires being aware of its digital 
circumference·
One may wonder whether such an awareness can lead the way to better 
designs or not, for which the answer would be 'not necessarily·' 
After all, design is about thinking· Yet, does not thinking require 
awareness?
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